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At various times since the September 11, 2001 attacks in New
York and Washington, D.C., concerns have been raised that the
United States has transferred captured al Qaeda operatives to the cus-
tody and control of other nations in violation of normal extradition
procedures.' Some reports imply that the transfers circumvent legal
requirements and are inherently illegal.2 Others hint that such trans-
fers are undertaken for the purpose of securing means of interroga-
tion by other countries that the United States could not itself lawfully
* Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt
Hall); Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute. I thank Greg Jacobs for his
invaluable help with this Article.
1 See, e.g., David E. Kaplan et al., Playing Offense: The Inside Story of How U.S. Terror-
ist Hunters Are Going After al Qaeda, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 2, 2003, at 19, 27
("The CIA has helped move dozens of detainees not only to Jordan but also to Egypt,
Morocco, and even Syria."); Paul Vallely, The Invisible, INDEPENDENT (London), June
26, 2003, at 2 (recounting transfers to Syria, Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan). U.S. offi-
cials acknowledge that they do at times transfer prisoners to other countries. See, e.g.,
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Department of Defense News Briefing
(Mar. 28, 2002) ("In some cases we will proceed with transfers to another country
...."), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/t03282002_t0328sd.
html; Under Secretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith, Department of Defense News
Briefing, (Mar. 22, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002
("We are talking with various countries about the possibility of transferring people
that we are holding after we are no longer interested in prosecuting them.").
2 See, e.g., Kaplan et al., supra note 1, at 19 (stating that the CIA has "spirited
prisoners to nations with brutal human-rights records") (emphasis added); Dana
Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations: 'Stress and Duress'
Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. PosT, Dec. 26,
2002, at Al ("These 'extraordinary renditions' are done without resort to legal pro-
cess and usually involve countries with security services known for using brutal
means."); Vallely, supra note 1 (stating that "[t] here is a new tolerance of the suspen-
sion of due legal process").
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employ.3 Some have speculated that the United States uses the threat
of such transfers as a means to coerce or trick information from cap-
tured terrorists that remain in its custody.4 In sum, most accounts
have portrayed such transfers as lawless, morally reprehensible, or
both.
These accounts imply that alternative peacetime transfer proce-
dures exist that are both adequate to meet the government's legiti-
mate objectives and meet the requirements of due process. There
appear to be only two available peacetime options by which such
transfers might be effected-extradition or removal pursuant to the
immigration statutes. The first Part of this Article examines the im-
plicit claim that extradition and removal provide functional alterna-
tives by which to transfer captured terrorists. I conclude that in the
context of the present armed conflict against al Qaeda, both proce-
dures are too highly specialized and narrow in scope to provide an
adequate alternative.
The second Part of the Article explores the claim that transfers
pursuant to the President's powers as Commander in Chief are law-
less. Throughout history, the laws of war have permitted army com-
manders to dispose of the liberty of prisoners captured during military
engagements. This power has traditionally included the right to trans-
fer such prisoners to the custody of third parties, including neutral
countries and allied belligerents. As a matter of constitutional text
and structure, the authority to determine the handling of military de-
tainees is conferred on the President by the Commander in Chief
Clause, which is located in Article II of the Constitution. Our consti-
tutional history and practice confirm this. Since the Founding era,
the President has exercised exclusive and virtually unfettered control
over the disposition of enemy soldiers and agents captured in time of
war. Indeed, on several occasions throughout American history, the
President, either in furtherance of particular diplomatic or military
objectives or merely for the sake of convenience, has transferred cap-
3 See, e.g., Priest & Gellman, supra note 2 ("One official who has had direct in-
volvement in renditions said he knew they were likely to be tortured.").
4 See, e.g., Connie Chung & Kelli Arena, Connie Chung Tonight (CNN television
broadcast Nov. 22, 2002) (transcript available at 2002 WL 105159555) ("Chung: What
would be those hot buttons that would get him to reveal information? Arena: Connie,
interrogators suggest that it could be a variety of things. One: Is he worried about
family members and their safety? Is he worried about being transferred into the cus-
tody of another country that may use torture in interrogations?"); Priest & Gellman,
supra note 2 (" [T] he intelligence agency undertakes a 'false flag' operation using fake
decor and disguises meant to deceive a captive into thinking he is imprisoned in a
country with a reputation for brutality, when, in reality, he is still in CIA hands.").
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tured enemy combatants from the custody and control of the United
States to that of other foreign nations.
I make no judgment here about the policy or moral implications
of transferring captured terrorists to other nations. I do not discuss
whether transferring such detainees to other countries is in the short-
term or long-term interests of the United States. However, as the sec-
ond Part of this Article demonstrates, rules of both domestic and in-
ternational law constrain the circumstances under which such
transfers can be effected. These rules are unquestionably designed to
address moral concerns of the sort raised and to prevent illegal prac-
tices such as torture. For various reasons that are explained within,
many of these rules do not apply to transfers made in the context of
the current armed conflict. Nevertheless, they do impose important
constraints on the general practice of transferring military detainees.
Those who imply that a departure from peacetime rules is tantamount
to a descent into lawless, ultra vires action are simply incorrect. War-
fare is characterized by different constraints than those that govern
peacetime, but it is nonetheless subject to and bound by the rule of
law.
I. THE PEACETIME REGIME FOR TRANSFERS
On September 11, 2001, four coordinated terrorist attacks took
place in rapid succession, aimed at critical government buildings in
our nation's capital and the heart of our national financial system.
Terrorists hijacked four airplanes. One plane crashed into the Penta-
gon in Arlington, Virginia and two crashed into the World Trade Cen-
ters in New York City. The fourth, which was headed towards either
the White House or Congress in Washington, D.C., crashed in Penn-
sylvania after passengers apparently attempted to regain control of the
aircraft. The attacks caused about three thousand deaths and
thousands more injuries, disrupted air traffic and communications
within the United States, closed the national stock exchanges for sev-
eral days, and caused damage that has been estimated to run into the
billions of dollars.
5
The President has found that these attacks are part of a violent
terrorist campaign against the United States by groups affiliated with
the Qaeda terrorist organization. Other al Qaeda-linked attacks
5 See, e.g., Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citi-
zens in the War Against Terrorism § 1(b), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833 (Nov. 13,
2001); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2001, at 1 (2002), availa-
ble at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10319.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL
TERRORISM] (recounting the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001).
2004] 118 5
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
against the United States prior to September 11 include the suicide
bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, the bombing of American embas-
sies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the attack on a U.S. military hous-
ing complex in Saudi Arabia in 1996, and the bombing of the World
Trade Center in 1993.6 Al Qaeda continues its terrorist campaign
against the United States and its allies and interests abroad to this day.
It is believed to have been responsible for, or connected with, numer-
ous terrorist incidents following September 11, including the Decem-
ber 2001 attempt by al Qaeda associate Richard Colvin Reid to ignite a
shoe bomb on a transatlantic flight from Paris to Miami, an April 2002
explosion at a synagogue in Djerba, an October 2002 explosion on a
French oil tanker off the Yemeni coast, a series of bombs on the Indo-
nesian resort island of Bali that same month, and two attacks on Is-
raeli targets in Kenya in November 2002.
7
In response, the federal government has engaged in a broad ef-
fort at home and abroad to counter terrorism. Pursuant to his author-
ities as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, the President in
October 2001 ordered the U.S. military to attack al Qaeda personnel
and assets in Afghanistan and the Taliban militia that harbored them.
That military campaign, although continuing to this day, has achieved
significant success, with the retreat of al Qaeda and Taliban forces
from their strongholds, and the installation of a friendly provisional
government in Afghanistan. Congress provided its support for the use
of force against those linked to the September 11 attacks and has rec-
ognized the President's constitutional power to use force to prevent
and deter future attacks both within and outside the United States.8
Robert Delahunty and I have argued elsewhere that the President has
the constitutional power to use force unilaterally in response to the
September 11 attacks.9 The Justice Department and the FBI have
launched a sweeping investigation in response to the attacks, and in
Fall 2001, Congress enacted legislation to expand the Justice Depart-
6 See, e.g., YONAH ALEXANDER & MICHAEL S. SWETNAM, USAMA BIN LADEN'S AL-
QAIDA: PROFILE OF A TERRORIST NETWORK 1 (2001); GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 5,
at 105.
7 See, e.g., Three Decades of Terror, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, available at 2003 WL
3918586; GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 5, at 105.
8 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 10740, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
9 Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President's Constitutional Authority to
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or
Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 487 (2002).
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ment's powers of surveillance against terrorists.' 0 By executive order,
the President created a new Office of Homeland Security within the
White House to coordinate the domestic program against terrorism.I
Congress subsequently enacted the President's proposal to establish a
new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security, which consoli-
dates twenty-two previously disparate domestic agencies into one de-
partment in order to better protect the nation against security
threats.
1 2
During the current conflict with the Qaeda terrorist organization,
captured enemy combatants have typically been (1) noncitizens (2)
captured in foreign lands and (3) detained outside of U.S. territory.
13
This pattern is typical of most of the United States' recent military
engagements, which have rarely been fought on U.S. soil. Under
these circumstances, the transfer of captured individuals to the cus-
tody and control of other nations may be essential to meet a number
of legitimate and important policy objectives. For example, an allied
nation may have cultural or linguistic connections with a captured in-
dividual that the United States lacks, placing that nation in a position
to more effectively establish a rapport with the individual and allowing
for more effective interrogations. At other times, it may be diplomati-
cally or politically desirable to grant the request of an allied nation to
repatriate one or more of its citizens that have been captured while
fighting for the enemy.14 Under certain circumstances, it may be nec-
essary to share with other nations the administrative burdens and ex-
penses associated with detaining enemy combatants.' 5 Allied nations
may also have useful treaty relationships or other diplomatic ties that
10 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272.
11 Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security
Council, Exec. Order No. 13,228, 3 C.F.R. 796 (2002).
12 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
13 Most of the detainees are being held at the U.S. naval station at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. The Supreme Court is hearing the case involving whether Guantanamo
Bay can be considered to be within the territory of the United States for purposes of
the writ of habeas corpus. See Rasul v. Bush, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003).
14 For a discussion in the British House of Lords about attempts to secure repre-
sentation by British attorneys, a fair trial, and humane conditions for captured British
citizens detained by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, see Lord Hylton &
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean, Lords' Written Answers in the United Kingdom
House of Lords (Oct. 6, 2003), available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-off
ice.co.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/ldsO3/text/31006wO6.htm.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 58-63.
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the United States lacks but that the allied nation can take advantage of
with respect to captured individuals. As discussed below, these bene-
fits may be difficult to achieve by transfers that occur within the civil-
ian law enforcement frameworks of extradition or immigration.
A. Extradition
"Throughout its history, extradition has remained a system con-
sisting of several processes whereby one sovereign surrenders to an-
other sovereign a person sought as an accused criminal or a fugitive
offender."16 In the United States, an individual cannot be extradited
to another country absent a "statute or treaty [that] confers the
power. '17 The statutes and treaties governing extradition impose a
variety of limitations on the circumstances under which extradition
may be effected. 18 The most significant limitation for present pur-
poses, however, is that the power to extradite is triggered only when
another country requests the extradition of an individual for purposes
of criminal prosecution. 19 This limitation alone renders extradition
generally inadequate for transfers in an armed conflict. Only rarely
will a desired transferee nation be in a position to bring criminal
charges against a captured enemy combatant, as the combatant will
most likely have been operating outside the transferee nation's terri-
tory and will not have transgressed any of the transferee nation's laws.
This significant limitation on the extradition power removes extradi-
tion from contention as an adequate alternative procedure.
16 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW &
PRACTICE 29 (4th ed. 2002); see also Jimenez v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 84 S. Ct. 14 (1963)
(denying stay of extradition for petitioner to stand trial in Venezuela for murder, as
requested by the Venezuelan Government pursuant to a treaty).
17 Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936).
18 See BASsIOUNI, supra note 16, at 461-586 (discussing common extradition limi-
tations such as dual criminality, the rule of specialty, and political offense exceptions).
19 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000) (noting that the extradition power is trig-
gered when a complaint is made against an individual accusing him of "having com-
mitted within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes
provided for by such treaty or convention"); Convention on Extradition, Dec. 26,
1933, art. I, 49 Stat. 3111, 3113-14, 165 L.N.T.S. 47, 51 ("Each one of the signatory
States in harmony with the stipulations of the present Convention assumes the obliga-
tion of surrendering to any one of the States which may make the requisition, the
persons who may be in their territory and who are accused or under sentence.") (emphasis
added).
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B. Removal Under the Immigration Laws
Removal rules are almost entirely inapplicable to the present con-
flict, and indeed to most military engagements, because they govern
only aliens who are either apprehended at the border or are being
held within the territory of the United States.20 Moreover, normal re-
moval procedures-those that apply to the vast majority of aliens who
are illegally in the United States-strictly limit the places to which an
alien can legally be removed. Although the first of these reasons is
alone sufficient to render removal procedures a clearly inadequate al-
ternative to military transfers, this section will briefly describe the
strict statutory limitations on the place to which an alien may be
removed.
1. Designated Place of Removal Under the Normal Removal
Procedures
Under the statutory guidelines, the place to which an alien is to
be removed depends on whether the alien was ever lawfully admitted
to the United States. Aliens who are stopped upon their arrival at the
United States "shall be removed to the country in which the alien
boarded the vessel or aircraft on which the alien arrived in the United
States." 21 If the alien arrived from a foreign territory contiguous to
the United States or an island adjacent to the United States but is not
a citizen of that territory or island, the alien shall be removed "to the
country in which the alien boarded the vessel that transported the
alien to the territory or island. '22 If, and only if, the designated coun-
try is unwilling to accept the alien, then the alien may be removed to a
country of which the alien is a citizen, subject, or national, the country
in which the alien was born, or a country in which the alien has a
residence. 2 3 If each of these three options is found to be "impractica-
ble, inadvisable, or impossible," then the alien may be removed to any
country that is willing to accept him.
24
All other aliens who are subject to removal under the normal re-
moval procedures are generally allowed to designate the country to
20 See Immigration & Naturalization Act (INA) § 241(b) (1) (A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b) (1)(A) (2000) (governing aliens apprehended at the border); id.
§ 241 (b) (2) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (2) (A) (governing aliens held within the United
States).
21 Id. § 241(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(1)(A).
22 Id. § 241(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(1)(B).
23 Id. § 241(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(1)(C).
24 Id.
2004] 1 189
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which they wish to be relocated. 25 The Attorney General may ignore
that designation, however, if he "decides that removing the alien to
the country is prejudicial to the United States."26 The Attorney Gen-
eral must then remove the alien "to a country of which the alien is a
subject, national, or citizen" unless the governments of all of the appli-
cable countries either refuse to accept the alien or fail to send word of
their acceptance or nonacceptance of the alien to the Attorney Gen-
eral within thirty days. 27 In the event that an alien is not removed
pursuant to any of these provisions, the Attorney General is granted a
range of options as to where he may send the alien, including- if and
only if it is determined that all of the other available options are "im-
practicable, inadvisable, or impossible"-to "another country whose
government will accept the alien into that country."2
Special provisions govern the removal of aliens when the United
States is at war. Upon a finding that a war has rendered it "inadvisa-
ble, inconvenient, or impossible" to utilize normal removal proce-
dures, the Attorney General has two options. 29 If the government of
the country of which the alien is a citizen is in exile, the alien may be
removed to the country that is hosting the exiled government. 30 If, on
the other hand, the government of which the alien is a citizen is not in
exile, the alien may be removed to "a country... that is very near the
country of which the alien.is a citizen or subject, or, with the consent
of the government of the country of which the alien is a citizen or
subject, to another country."3' These procedures allow some addi-
tional flexibility in the removal of some aliens during time of war. For
example, an alien who is a citizen of a Middle Eastern country could
probably be removed to nearby Egypt, while a citizen of Afghanistan
could be removed to nearby Russia or India. However, there do not
appear to be any court decisions that have addressed the scope of
these special provisions outside of the context of a formal, congressio-
nally declared war, and it is possible that the courts could deny them
any effect during times of more limited military engagements.
In conclusion, the normal removal procedures allow for transfer
of an alien to a country of the Attorney General's choice only in cer-
tain circumstances. Aliens who were never legally admitted to the
United States are typically returned to the country from whence they
25 Id. § 241 (b) (2) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b) (2) (A).
26 Id. § 241(b) (2) (C) (iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (2) (C) (iv).
27 Id. § 241 (b) (2) (D), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b) (2) (D).
28 Id. § 241(b)(2)(E)(vii), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E)(vii).
29 Id. § 241(b)(2)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(F).
30 Id. § 241(b)(2)(F)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(F)(i).
31 Id. § 241(b) (2) (F) (ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (2) (F) (ii).
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came, while aliens who were lawfully admitted to the United States are
typically permitted to designate a country of their choice to which
they wish to be removed. In those instances in which this first removal
option proves to be unavailable, the statutes accord what amounts to a
right of first refusal to the country in which the alien resides and to
the country of the alien's citizenship to be the place to which the alien
will be removed. Only when all of the statutorily designated countries
are either unwilling to accept the alien or are deemed prejudicial to
the United States by the Attorney General does authority devolve to
the Attorney General to designate the country to which the alien will
be removed.
Simply put, this convoluted process does not provide a reliable
mechanism for transferring captured enemy combatants in the con-
flict against al Qaeda. Most significantly, the immigration laws would
not apply to enemy combatants captured and held abroad, because
the statutes apply only when an alien seeks entry into the United
States. They provide no framework, and no authorization or prohibi-
tion, on the detention of enemy combatants outside the United States.
2. Special Removal Procedures for Alien Terrorists
Special statutory procedures govern the removal of alien ter-
rorists. These procedures provide the Attorney General with the best
and most flexible option for removing alien terrorists to a country of
his choice. To secure such a removal order, the Department ofJustice
must prove to an immigration judge (1) that the targeted alien is a
terrorist and (2) that removal of the alien under the normal proce-
dures "would pose a risk to the national security of the United
States."32 The statute defines an alien terrorist as an alien "who has
engaged, is engaged, or at any time after admission engages in any
terrorist activity,"33 including hijacking, sabotage, hostage taking, as-
sassination, violent attacks upon internationally protected persons,
and the use of explosives, firearms, or biological and chemical agents
with intent to endanger safety or property (other than for purely per-
sonal monetary gain).3 4 The government is permitted to use classified
information to make its case against an alien, in which case the infor-
mation is reviewed by the judge ex parte and in camera. The hearing
is otherwise open to the public, however, and the alien must be af-
forded the right to counsel and the right to introduce evidence. 35 A
32 Id. § 503(a)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(D).
33 Id. § 237(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B).
34 Id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii).
35 See id. § 504(a)(2), (c)(1)-(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(2), (c)(1)-(2).
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trial judge's order of removal can be appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
36
The statute provides that alien terrorists who are ordered re-
moved "shall be [removed] to any country which the alien shall desig-
nate."37 The alien need not be removed to the country selected by the
alien, however, "if the Attorney General, in consultation with the Sec-
retary of State, determines that removal of the alien to the country so
designated would impair a treaty obligation or adversely affect United
States foreign policy. '38 If the alien is not removed to the country of
his designation, "the Attorney General shall cause the alien to be re-
moved to any country willing to receive such alien." 39 Thus, so long as
a legitimate foreign policy interest supports the Attorney General's
refusal to remove an alien to the country of his designation, the alien
can legally be removed to any country of the Attorney General's
choice.
To be sure, these procedures provide the federal government
with considerable latitude in determining the country to which appre-
hended alien terrorists should be removed. Nonetheless, they are still
inadequate to meet the United States' policy objectives during the
present conflict. As with the other immigration laws, they apply only
to aliens located within the United States. It should also be noted that
it appears, as of this writing, that the special alien terrorist removal
procedures have never been used.
II. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMANDER IN CHIEF AUTHORITY TO
TRANSFER ENEMY COMBATANTS
The limited reach of the extradition and immigration removal
statutes does not leave the United States in a purgatory where it has
no authority other than to detain enemy combatants captured during
the armed conflict with the Qaeda terrorist organization. Rather, the
September 11 attacks triggered a state of armed conflict with al
Qaeda, and the war powers of the federal government in general and
the President in particular provide sufficient authority to transfer cap-
tured enemy combatants to allied countries. This Part discusses the
sources of the President's constitutional authority. Throughout U.S.
history, the Constitution's vesting of the Commander in Chief and
Chief Executive powers in the President have been understood to pro-
vide this affirmative legal authority. These grants include the author-
36 Id. § 505(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1535(a)(1).
37 Id. § 507(b) (2) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1537(b) (2) (A).




ity to dispose of the liberty of enemy soldiers and agents captured in
time of war. This view of the President's war powers is supported by
the Constitution's text and a comprehensive understanding of its
structural allocation of powers, and by an unbroken chain of historical
practice dating back to the Founding era. In tandem, these sources
demonstrate that the Commander in Chief Clause constitutes an inde-
pendent grant of substantive authority to engage in the detention and
transfer of prisoners captured in armed conflicts.
A. The September 11 Attacks and War
Before discussing whether the President's war powers include the
authority to transfer enemy combatants, we must first determine
whether the September 11 attacks initiated a state of armed conflict.
If September 11 was not an act of war, then the United States might
be limited to the tools of the criminal justice system in its efforts to
fight the Qaeda terrorist organization. As we have seen in Part I, Con-
gress has provided the executive branch with only extradition or im-
migration removal as legal methods for transferring terrorist suspects
in peacetime. Obviously, the federal government and the President
can access the additional powers made available by the Constitution in
wartime only if war, in fact, exists.
As I have argued elsewhere, 40 there are two approaches to this
question, procedural and substantive. As a matter of constitutional
process, the nation has already decided that it is in a state of war.
President Bush has found the attacks to constitute an attack that has
placed the United States in a state of armed conflict.41 As a matter of
domestic law, the President's finding settles the question whether the
United States is at war. In the Prize Cases, the Supreme Court ex-
plained that it was up to the President to determine that a state of war
existed that warranted, in regard to the southern states, the "character
of belligerents. '42 The judiciary, the Court noted, would be bound by
the President's determinations in evaluating whether the laws of war
40 John Yoo & James Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 207 (2003).
41 The President has found that
[i]nternational terrorists, including members of al Qaida, have carried out
attacks on United States diplomatic and military personnel and facilities
abroad and on citizens and property within the United States on a scale that
has created a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the United
States Armed Forces.
Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism § 1(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
42 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862).
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applied to the blockade he had instituted.43 This result obtains re-
gardless of where one comes out on the war powers debate.44 Even
those scholars who argue that Congress must declare war before the
United States may use force abroad usually concede that the President
may act unilaterally in response to an attack.45 As far as I know, the
federal courts have never questioned a presidential determination,
even in the absence of Congress, that the nation is at war, nor have
they ever found that the President has violated the Constitution by
using force unilaterally.46 Even if one believed that congressional au-
thorizations were necessary, Public Law Number 107-40, enacted a
43 According to the Court,
[w]hether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-in-Chief, in
suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance, and
a civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to
them the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him, and
this Court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political depart-
ment of the Government to which this power was entrusted .... The procla-
mation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the Court that
a state of war existed ....
Id.; see also The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700, 701-02 (1871) (relying on presi-
dential proclamations to determine start and end dates for the Civil War); Salois v.
United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 326, 333 (1898) (stating that if the government had treated a
band of Indians as at war, "the courts undoubtedly would be concluded by the execu-
tive action and be obliged to hold that the defendants were not in amity").
44 For recent examples on either side of the war powers question, compare John
C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2002) (arguing that a
declaration of war is unnecessary before the President can use military force), with
Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543 (2002) (argu-
ing that congressional authorization is necessary).
45 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 5 (1993) (explaining that
one reason the Constitution vested Congress with the power "to declare war," as op-
posed to the power "to make war," as an early draft stated, "was to reserve to the
president the power, without advance congressional authorization, to 'repel sudden
attacks'"); see also War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (3) (2000) (recognizing
the President's authority to use force in response to "a national emergency created by
attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces"). For
a discussion of this point, see Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 9, at 512-16 (explaining
how the War Powers Resolution andJoint Resolution "demonstrate Congress's accept-
ance of the President's unilateral war powers in an emergency situation").
46 See, e.g., John Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 427 (2003);John C. Yoo, Kosovo, WarPowers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 1673, 1673-731 (2000) [hereinafter Yoo, War Powers];John C. Yoo, The Contin-
uation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 167 (1996) [hereinafter Yoo, Continuation of Politics].
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week after the September 11 attacks, authorizes the President to use
military force in response to the attacks of September 11.47
As a substantive matter, it seems that September 11 satisfied the
requirements for an act of war. There is little disagreement with the
conclusion that if the September 11 attacks had been launched by
another nation, an armed conflict under international law would ex-
ist. The September 11 attacks were a "decapitation" strike: an effort to
eliminate the civilian and military leadership of the United States with
one stroke. In addition to killing the nation's leaders, al Qaeda
47 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (authorizing the use of force in response to the September 11 attacks). In
addition, although not relevant for domestic law purposes, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, the members of the Rio Treaty, and the members of the ANZUS treaty
all found that the September 11 attacks had triggered a right of self-defense. See
North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246
(recognizing "the right of individual or collective self-defense" in the event of an
armed attack); NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, Statement (Oct. 2, 2001),
available at www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm ("([I] t has now been de-
termined that the attack against the United States on 11 September was directed from
abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Wash-
ington Treaty .... ); see also Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the
United States of America, Sept. 1, 1951, art. IV, 3 U.S.T. 3420, 3423, 131 U.N.T.S. 83,
86; Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 3(1), 62 Stat.
1681, 1700, 21 U.N.T.S. 77, 95 [hereinafter Rio Treaty] ("[Ain armed attack by any
State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the Ameri-
can States .... "); Terrorist Threat to the Americas, O.A.S. Res. RC.24/RES.1/01 (Sept.
21, 2001), reprinted in40 ILM 1273, 1274 (2001), available atwww.oas.org/OASpage/
crisis/RC.24e.htm:
[Resolving t]hat these terrorist attacks against the United States of America
are attacks against all American states and that in accordance with all the
relevant provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
(Rio Treaty) and the principle of continental solidarity, all States Parties to
the Rio Treaty shall provide effective reciprocal assistance to address such
attacks and the threat of any similar attacks against any American state, and
to maintain the peace and security of the continent.
Id.; Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on Cam-
paign Against Terrorism Results (Oct. 1, 2001), available at 2001 WL 21898781, at *1
(noting that "Australia offered combat military forces and invoked Article IV of the
ANZUS Treaty, declaring September 11 an attack on Australia"). Although New Zea-
land has not formally withdrawn from the ANZUS pact, its 1985 refusal to allow U.S.
nuclear powered or nuclear armed ships to enter its ports caused the United States to
abrogate its ANZUS responsibilities toward New Zealand in 1986. See, e.g., Gary Har-
rington, International Agreements: United States Suspension of Security Obligations Toward
New Zealand, 28 HLv. INT'L L.J. 139 (1987). Nevertheless, following the September
11 attacks, New Zealand offered an unspecified number of commandos to assist in
America's military efforts; as Foreign Minister Phil Goff explained, "We don't need a
treaty to tell us what is right and what is wrong." World Reaction to Afghan Strikes,
Assoc. PRESS, Oct. 14, 2001, available at 2001 WL 28752064.
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sought to disrupt the economy by destroying the main buildings in
New York City's financial district. The attacks were coordinated from
abroad, by a foreign entity, with the primary aim of inflicting massive
civilian casualties and loss. Al Qaeda executed the attacks not in or-
der to profit, but to achieve an ideological and political objective-in
this case, apparently, changing U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.
Finally, the scope and the intensity of the destruction is one that in
the past had only rested within the power of a nation-state and should
qualify the attacks as an act of war.
Some question may remain about whether it makes sense to treat
the September 11, 2001 attacks as a massive crime, rather than a war,
despite the scope of the damage caused and the purpose behind the
attacks. Perhaps the critical question for determining whether the
laws of armed conflict apply here is whether the terrorist attacks were
a sufficiently organized and systematic set of violent actions that they
crossed a sufficient level of intensity to be considered "armed con-
flict." There can be no doubt that, whatever the "level of intensity"
required to create an armed conflict, the gravity and scale of the vio-
lence inflicted on the United States on September 11 crossed that
threshold. To use the words of one international treaty, which pro-
vides a guidepost for determining when an armed conflict exists, the
attacks are not mere "riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and
other acts of a similar nature," which, according to that convention,
do not constitute "armed conflict. 4 8 Rather, as explained above, the
terrorists have carried on a sustained campaign against the United
States, culminating on September 11 with a devastating series of coor-
dinated attacks resulting in a massive death toll.
49
48 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as Amended on 3 May 1996)
Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, May 3, 1996, art. 1(2), S. TREArv Doc. No. 105-1, at 39 (1997)
[hereinafter Protocol II].
49 In addition, the United States has determined that it is necessary to respond to
the attacks with military force. That decision is significant because one element often
cited for determining whether a situation involving a nonstate actor rises to the level
of an "armed conflict" (for example, for purposes of common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions) is whether a state responds with its regular military forces. The United
States has adopted this position in the past. See Legal Regulation of Use of Force, 3
CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW § 2, at 3443
(U.S. Dep't of State ed., 1995); see also G.I.A.D. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTrIONS
15-16 (1958) (suggesting that under common Article 3, "armed conflict" exists when
the government is "obliged to have recourse to its regular military forces").
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Some believe, however, that war is only an armed conflict that
occurs between states. Because al Qaeda is not a state, the reasoning
goes, there can be no armed conflict and no application of the laws of
war. To the extent this approach relies on the syllogism that, if a con-
flict is not between states it cannot be "war" and therefore the laws of
war cannot apply, the conclusion is contradicted by the terms of the
Geneva Conventions and consistent international practice. A provi-
sion common to all four Geneva Conventions, for example, creates
certain minimum standards of treatment of prisoners of war and civil-
ians that apply "[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an international
character" occurring within the territory of a party.50 This provision
specifically applies certain laws of war to conflicts that are not between
two states but occur solely within a single state between contending
parties. Later international agreements have further made this clear
by specifying what the laws of war do not apply to. The 1996 Amended
Protocol II to the 1980 U.N. Convention on Prohibitions or Restric-
tions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (to which the
United States is a party), for example, explains that it does not apply
to "internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and spo-
radic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature," because these
are not "armed conflicts. '51 These provisions make it plain that the
laws of armed conflict may apply to intense levels of hostilities con-
ducted by a nonstate actor. 52 Al Qaeda members do not escape the
laws of war because they are nonstate actors.
It is worth considering the results of a rule that finds the Septem-
ber 11 attacks to be crimes, rather than acts of war. Considering the
September 11 attacks to be crimes would have the effect of providing
al Qaeda terrorists with better legal treatment than soldiers who fight
on behalf of a nation in full accordance with the laws of war. In other
50 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288.
51 Protocol II, supra note 48, at 39.
52 It is true that some international legal authorities have commented that war
"must be between States." See, e.g., 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: DISPUTES,
WAR AND NEUTRALITY § 254, at 574 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1948). In making
that assertion, however, authors such as Oppenheim were suggesting only that, for a
conflict to be legitimate warfare, it must be between states. It does not follow from
that proposition that, if there is a conflict that amounts to warfare and nonstate actors
are involved, none of the rules of armed conflict apply. To the contrary, as Oppen-
heim recognized, a different conclusion follows-namely, that nonstate actors who
engage in warfare are engaged in a form of warfare that is illegitimate. See id. ("Pri-
vate individuals who take up arms and commit hostilities against the enemy do not
enjoy the privileges of armed forces, and the enemy has, according to a customary
rule of International Law, the right to treat such individuals as war criminals.").
2004] 1197
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
words, if a group of individuals hostile to the United States operates,
as al Qaeda does, by violating the core goal of the laws of war to pro-
tect civilian life during hostilities-by blurring the line between com-
batants and civilians and by intentionally targeting purely civilian
targets-a contrary rule would reward them with the protections of
the criminal justice system. On the other hand, those who fight ac-
cording to the laws of war, wear uniforms, and only target military
assets, would be deprived of Miranda, the right to a lawyer, arrest
upon probable cause, swift trial, conviction by proof beyond a reason-
able doubt, and so on. Perhaps, before September 11, such a perverse
incentive structure did not impose much cost due to the limited
threat posed by terrorism. In the past, usually only a sovereign or
quasi-sovereign entity with authority over a substantial territory could
have the resources to mount and sustain a series of attacks of suffi-
cient intensity to reach the level of a "war" or "armed conflict." The
terrorist network now facing the United States has found other means
to finance its campaign while operating from the territory of several
different nations at once. Indeed, as we have witnessed subsequent to
September 11, 2001-through al Qaeda's fielding of forces on the bat-
tlefield in Afghanistan and its efforts to develop or acquire weapons of
mass destruction-terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda have now
acquired the military power that once only rested in the hands of na-
tion-states. That change must bring terrorist networks within the laws
of war. Simply by operating outside the confines of the traditional
concepts of nation-states, terrorists cannot shield themselves from the
prohibitions universally commanded by the laws of armed conflict.
B. Constitutional Text and Structure
In light of the conclusion that the September 11 attacks initiated
an armed conflict between the United States and the Qaeda terrorist
organization, we now turn to the war power available to the President.
The text, structure, and history of the Constitution establish that the
Founders entrusted the President with the primary responsibility, and
therefore the power, to control and conduct military operations en-
gaged in by the United States. Article II, Section 2 states that "It] he
President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States." 53 The Commander in Chief
Clause is a substantive grant of authority to the President conferring
all those powers not expressly delegated by the Constitution to Con-
53 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 1.
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gress that have traditionally been exercised by commanders in chief of
armed forces. 54 The President is also vested broadly with all of " [t] he
executive Power" and the duty to execute the laws.55 By their terms, as
I have argued elsewhere, these provisions vest full control of the mili-
tary operations of the United States in the President.
56
Moreover, as the courts have consistently recognized, the Presi-
dent's discretion in exercising the Commander in Chief power is com-
plete, and his military decisions are not subject to challenge in the
courts. In the Prize Cases, for example, the Court faced the question
whether the President "in fulfilling his duties, as Commander in
Chief' could treat the rebellious States as belligerents by instituting a
blockade. 57 The Court concluded that this was a question "to be de-
cided by him" and which the Court could not question, but must leave
to "the political department of the Government to which this power
was entrusted."
58
The Constitution's textual commitment to the President of con-
trol over the minutiae and the grand strategy of military operations
alike is reinforced by analysis of the Constitution's structure. First, it is
clear that the Constitution secures all federal executive power in the
President to ensure a unity in purpose and energy in action. "Deci-
sion, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the pro-
ceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the
proceedings of any greater number. . . -59 The centralization of au-
thority in the President alone is particularly crucial in matters of na-
tional defense, war, and foreign policy, where a unitary executive can
evaluate threats, consider policy choices, and make command deci-
sions affecting operations in the field with a speed and energy that is
far superior to any other branch. As Hamilton noted, "Of all the cares
or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly de-
54 See, e.g., Yoo, Continuation of Politics, supra note 46, at 252-56.
55 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
56 See Yoo, supra note 44 passim.
57 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862).
58 Id. (emphasis added); see alsoJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950)
("Certainly it is not the function of the Judiciary to entertain private litigation-even
by a citizen-which challenges the legality, the wisdom, or the propriety of the Com-
mander in Chief in sending our armed forces abroad or to any particular region.");
United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 12 (1926) ("It was peculiarly within
the province of the Commander in Chief to know the facts and to determine what
disposition should be made of enemy properties in order effectively to carry on the
war.").
59 THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1982).
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mands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a
single hand."
60
The handling and disposition of individuals captured during mili-
tary operations requires command-type decisions and the swift exer-
cise of judgment that can only be made by "a single hand."61 The
strength of enemy forces, the morale of our troops, the gathering of
intelligence about the dispositions of the enemy, the construction of
infrastructure that is crucial to military operations, and the treatment
of captured United States servicemen may all be affected by the poli-
cies pursued in this arena. Quick, decisive determinations must often
be made in the face of the shifting contingencies of military for-
tunes.62 This is the essence of executive action.
Second, the constitutional structure requires that any ambiguity
in the allocation of a power that is executive in nature must be re-
solved in favor of the executive branch. Article II, Section 1 provides
that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America. '63 By contrast, Article I's Vesting Clause
gives Congress only the powers "herein granted." 64 This difference in
language indicates that Congress's legislative powers are limited to the
list enumerated in Article 1, Section 8, while the President's powers
include inherent executive powers that are unenumerated in the Con-
stitution. The unification of executive power in Article II requires
that unenumerated powers that can fairly be described as "executive"
in nature belong to the President, except where the Constitution ex-
pressly vests the power in Congress. For example, as Commander in
Chief, the President would ordinarily have plenary power to provide
rules for the armed forces, but Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 excepts
this power from the executive by expressly committing it to Con-
gress. 65 Even if the Constitution's entrustment of the Commander in
Chief power to the President did not bestow upon him the authority
to make unilateral determinations regarding the disposition of cap-
tured enemies, the President would nevertheless enjoy such a power
60 THE FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note 59, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton).
61 Id.
62 For historical examples of the impact that U.S. prisoner of war policy has had
in all of these areas, see generally GEORGE G. LEWIS & JOHN MEWRA, DEP'T OF THE
ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 20-213: HISTORY OF PRISONER OF WAR UTILIZATION BY THE
UNITED STATES ARMY 1776-1945 (1955).
63 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
64 Id. art. I, § 1.
65 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces . . . ").
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by virtue of the broad sweep of the Vesting Clause.66 Thus, the power
to dispose of the liberty of individuals captured and brought under
the control of U.S. armed forces during military operations remains in
the hands of the President alone unless the Constitution specifically
commits the power to Congress.
The debates over the drafting of the Constitution support the in-
ference that the Framers understood the Commander in Chief power
to include all powers related to the conduct of war, with the exception
only of those few powers that were expressly carved out and delegated
to Congress. During the debates in the Federal Convention, for ex-
ample, a clause that would have given Congress the power to "make"
war was amended to give Congress the power only to "declare" it, in
part because it was understood that as the Commander in Chief the
President should enjoy the sole authority to conduct warfare. 67 The
treatment of captured enemy soldiers is but one of the many facets of
the conduct of war, entrusted by the Constitution in plenary fashion
to the President by virtue of the Commander in Chief Clause. Moreo-
ver, it is an area in which the President enjoys exclusive authority, as
the power to handle captured enemy soldiers is not reserved by the
Constitution in whole or in part to any other branch of the
government.
It might be argued that Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, which
grants Congress the power to "make Rules concerning Captures on
Land and Water," 68 addresses the power to regulate captured enemy
soldiers. That provision has never been applied by the courts or by
Congress to captured persons, however, and appears always to have
been understood as pertaining to captured property only. Article IX
of the Articles of Confederation, from which the provision is derived,
more clearly indicated that the power extended only to property, stat-
ing that Congress would have the power "of establishing rules for de-
ciding in all cases, what captures on land or water shall be legal, and
in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of
the United States shall be divided or appropriated. '69 The Articles of
Confederation provision clearly did not apply to captured enemy
soldiers, as persons can neither be "divided" nor "appropriated."
66 For discussion of the interpretation of the Article II Vesting Clause in the con-
text of foreign affairs, see JOHN YOO, WAR, PEACE, AND THE CONSTITUTION (forthcom-
ing 2004) (manuscript ch. 2, on file with author); and Saikrishna B. Prakash &
Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001).
67 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318-19 (Max Far-
rand ed., 3d ed. 1966).
68 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11,
69 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (U.S. 1781).
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Moreover, the term capture, which is used both in the Articles of Con-
federation and in the Constitution, is defined by international law as
"[t]he taking of property by one belligerent from another or from an
offending neutral."70 Thus, in his exhaustive commentaries on the
Constitution, Justice Story noted that Article I, Section 8, Clause 11
confers on Congress the power to "authorize the seizure and condem-
nation of the property of the enemy within, or without the territory of
the United States," yet he made no mention of any authority being
vested in Congress over captured persons. 7' This contextual under-
standing of the text of Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, buttressed by the
absence in the historical record of any invocations of the clause by
Congress or the courts in support of legislation applying to captured
persons, confirms that Congress's power "to make Rules concerning
Captures on Land or Water" applies only to captured property.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 12, which vests Congress with the au-
thority to "raise and support Armies, ' 72 and Clause 14, which vests it
with power to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces," 73 might also be thought to confer on Congress
the power to promulgate prisoner of war policy. Using its funding
power, Congress might attempt to place legislative riders on military
appropriations that would seek to require certain treatment of prison-
ers of war. It is subject to serious constitutional question whether
Congress can use the appropriations power to interfere with areas of
plenary presidential power, but whatever the answer to that question,
Congress has made no attempt to do so with respect to prisoners of
war. It is also possible that Congress could attempt to use its constitu-
tional authority to make rules for regulation of the military to estab-
lish standards for prisoner detention and transfer. Congress's power
on this point is likely limited to the discipline of U.S. troops, and
probably does not extend to issues such as the rules of engagement
and treatment concerning enemy combatants, but again Congress has
not enacted any such statute. In fact, Congress's historical silence, as
will be explained below, demonstrates that Congress itself has not un-
derstood its powers to reach so far into areas of presidential authority.
The historical context in which the Constitution was ratified sup-
plies additional support for the view that the constitutional structure
allocates to the President the plenary power to dispose of the liberty of
70 1 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 422 (Francis Rawle ed., 3d rev. ed., Vernon Law
Book Co. 1914) (1839) (emphasis added).
71 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1172, at 64 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833).
72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
73 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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military detainees. This understanding of the Constitution's alloca-
tion of powers between Congress and the President is informed by the
unwritten British Constitution's allocation of powers between Parlia-
ment and the Crown. The Framers lived under the British Constitu-
tion as colonists, and in drafting their own Constitution they
borrowed heavily from the legal and political concepts that formed
the foundation principles of British constitutional government. Sig-
nificant departures from the framework of the British government
were explicitly spelled out in the Constitution's text, with the gaps left
to be filled in by the Framers' shared understanding of the functional
workings of the government under which they had lived. Reference
to the British Constitution may shed particular light on those broad
questions of power allocation that are not clearly answered by the text
of the Constitution alone, for the British Constitution supplied the
Framers with expectations about the manner in which sovereign pow-
ers should be allocated in a constitutional system of government.74
By the late eighteenth century, it was well established under the
British Constitution that the Crown had absolute authority to dispose
as it saw fit of prisoners of war and other detainees. At the Battle of
Agincourt in. 1415, for example, King Henry V ordered the execution
of a large number of French prisoners of war in retaliation for a
French attack on part of the English baggage train. 75 Similarly, dur-
ing the War of the Roses in 1471 it was understood to be the preroga-
tive of King Edward IV to decide which Lancastrian prisoners of war
should live and which would die. 76 Although the treatment of prison-
ers of war generally improved as time went on, the Crown's unilateral
control of their handling remained undiminished. When the Spanish
Armada was destroyed by a storm off the coast of Scotland in 1588,
Queen Elizabeth and her Privy Council dictated every detail of the
confinement of captured sailors, including the amount of the allow-
ance to which they were entitled as prisoners of war. 77 The Privy
Council also assumed responsibility for determining which captured
soldiers were entitled to prisoner of war status, denying the legal clas-
sification to those sailors it determined had simply been shipwrecked
74 For the importance of the British constitution in interpreting the President's
war powers, see Yoo, Continuation of Politics, supra note 46 passim.
75 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNMENT 4 (Jonathan F. Vance ed.,
2000).
76 See id. at 315.
77 See PAULA MARTIN, SPANISH ARMADA PRISONERS: THE STORY OF THE NUESTRA
SENOUR DEL RosURIO AND HER CREW 44-46, 48 (1988) (quoting a Privy Council order
stating that it was "her Majesty's pleasure that the Spanish prisoners for their relief
should be allowed to every each of them 4d per diem").
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on their way home to Spain.78 During this and future periods, Parlia-
ment never sought to interfere with the executive's prerogatives re-
garding the disposition of prisoners of war.
The Crown's control of prisoners of war as a matter incident to
military operations was also left untouched by the restructuring of the
British Constitution during the civil wars of the mid-seventeenth cen-
tury. Queen Anne rejected a prisoner of war exchange cartel pro-
posed by King Louis XIV of France in 1703, largely because she was
personally insulted that Louis refused to recognize her as the legiti-
mate heir to the English throne.79 And during the Revolutionary War
in America, the British field commanders, who ultimately were con-
trolled by the King, took charge of handling POWs. General Howe,
for example, established a Commissary General of Prisoners in 1776
to handle the many soldiers captured in New Jersey and New York,
and he later determined that many of the soldiers should be held at
sea in prison ships.80 There was no doubt, under the British constitu-
tional system in the eighteenth century, that the executive's com-
mander in chief power included the sole authority to control POWs.
When drafting and ratifying the Constitution in 1787, the Framers
would have understood the President's Commander in Chief and
Chief Executive powers as encompassing the power to dispose of the
liberty of prisoners of war. The Framers made no express allocation
in the Constitution of the power to dispose of persons captured dur-
ing military engagements; their silence on the point signals their in-
tent to leave the executive nature of the power untouched.
C. Historical Practice Under the Constitution
Both the Supreme Court and the political branches have often
recognized that governmental practice plays a significant role in estab-
lishing the contours of the constitutional separation of powers: "[A]
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowl-
edge of the Congress and never before questioned ... may be treated
as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art.
II."'81 Indeed, as the Court has observed, the role of practice in fixing
the meaning of the separation of powers is implicit in the Constitution
itself: "'the Constitution ... contemplates that practice will integrate
78 See id. at 52.
79 Mark A. Thompson, Louis XIV and the Grand Alliance, 1705-10, in WILLIAM III
AND Louis XIV: EssAYs 1680-1720, at 192 (R. Hatton & J.S. Bromley eds., 1968).
80 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNMENT, supra note 75, at 6-7.
81 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
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the dispersed powers into a workable government.'" 8 2 The role of
practice is heightened in dealing with issues affecting foreign affairs
and national security, where the Court has often deferred to the prac-
tice of the political branches.
83
Accordingly, great weight must be given to the practice of the
President and Congress in determining the scope of the President's
authority to detain and transfer prisoners captured in war. In this
case, the historical record unequivocally demonstrates that the Presi-
dent has exercised unchallenged and exclusive control over individu-
als captured during military operations since the time of the
Founding. Presidents have established confinement conditions for
prisoners of war, negotiated terms and conditions for the exchange of
captured soldiers, promulgated rules requiring captured enemy per-
sonnel to perform productive labor, and, significantly, transferred
prisoners of war to the custody and control of other foreign nations.
With respect to each of these functions, Congress has never seriously
questioned the President's authority. The history of prisoner of war
policy strongly supports reading the Constitution as vesting in the
President all of the traditional authority enjoyed by army commanders
in chief to dispose of the liberty of captured individuals. I review the
relevant history here to demonstrate the depth of support for the con-
clusion that the President enjoys the unrestricted constitutional power
to dispose of prisoners of war.
82 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) (quoting Youngstown, 343
U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
83 As the Supreme Court has noted, "the decisions of the Court in th[e] area [of
foreign affairs] have been rare, episodic, and afford little precedential value for subse-
quent cases." Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981). In particular, the
difficulty the courts experience in addressing "the broad range of vitally important
day-to-day questions regularly decided by Congress or the Executive," id. at 661, with
respect to foreign affairs and national security makes the judiciary "acutely aware of
the necessity to rest (judicial] decision[s] on the narrowest possible ground capable
of deciding the case." Id. at 660. Historical practice and the ongoing tradition of
executive branch constitutional interpretation therefore play an especially important
role in this area.
The framers of the Constitution employed words in their natural sense; and
where they are plain and clear, resort to collateral aids to interpretation is
unnecessary and cannot be indulged in to narrow or enlarge the text; but
where there is ambiguity or doubt, or where two views may well be enter-
tained, contemporaneous and subsequent practical construction are entitled
to the greatest weight.
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892).
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1. The Revolutionary War
The absence of a constitutionally recognized chief executive dur-
ing the Revolutionary period and the dominance of the Continental
Congress in directing certain aspects of the Continental Army's mili-
tary operations cast a cloud upon the utility of U.S. practices during
the Revolutionary era in discerning constitutional meaning. Never-
theless, the prisoner of war policies practiced by early American mili-
tary forces indicate that the Founders recognized the power of the
sovereign, consistent with contemporary European practices, to trans-
fer prisoners of war to the custody and control of foreign nations.
American naval forces that captured British prisoners at sea typically
turned the prisoners over to French control. 84 On the home front,
General George Washington established the living conditions of cap-
tured British soldiers who had fallen under his control. 85 Although
not yet in the position of President, General Washington held the title
of Commander in Chief of the Continental Army, and neither the
Continental Congress (which itself was more of an executive branch
than a legislature that could tax or legislate) nor the state assemblies
questioned his authority to handle and control prisoners of war. In
this respect, General Washington exercised his authority in line with
the traditional Anglo-American understanding of the scope of the
Commander in Chief power.
2. The Quasi-War with France
As tensions between the United States and France intensified dur-
ing the late 1790s, Congress passed a series of statutes pertaining to
the disposition of French vessels captured during military engage-
ments defending American shipping.86 The first such statute merely
authorized the President "to seize, take and bring into any port of the
United States" French ships found to be "committing depredations"
on vessels belonging to citizens of the United States.8 7 Three subse-
84 LEwis & MEWHA, supra note 62, at 5.
85 See Letter from George Washington, General, Continental Army, to Thomas
Gage, General, British Army (Aug. 11, 1775), reprinted in 67 CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 2d Sess. 407-08 (1865).
86 Congress is expressly granted the power to make rules for the disposition of
captured enemy property. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 ("The Congress shall have
Power [to] . . . make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water .... ). For a
general discussion of the Quasi-War, see STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE
OF FEDERALISM 643-62 (1993).
87 See Act of May 28, 1798, ch. 48, 1 Stat. 561.
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quent statutes, however, also included provisions relating to the dispo-
sition of the crews and officers of captured enemy ships-"
The first statute relating to captured sailors provided that
it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, to cause the
officers and crews of the vessels so captured . . . to be confined in
any place of safety within the United States... and all marshals and
other officers of the United States are hereby required to execute
such orders as the President may issue for the said purpose.
8 9
It appears that this statute was designed to serve two purposes. First, it
was intended to send a clear message to France that her predations
would no longer be tolerated, and that her countrymen would suffer
the penalty of imprisonment if attacks on American shipping did not
cease.9 0 Second, the statute's language indicates that it was designed
88 See Act of Feb. 28, 1799, ch. 18, 1 Stat. 624; Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 68, § 8, 1
Star. 578, 580; Act ofJune 28, 1798, ch. 62, § 4, 1 Stat. 574, 575. It is unclear which of
its enumerated powers Congress was invoking to pass these statutes. One arguable
source of authority would have been Congress's power to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which might be construed to allow
Congress to take measures to protect foreign commerce. The foreign commerce
power was never mentioned during the debates in Congress, however, and at any rate,
it could not by itself supply the whole answer, as the authorization of prisoner ex-
changes, for example, had nothing to do with the protection of foreign commerce.
Another arguable source of authority would have been Congress's power to "define
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against
the Law of Nations." Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Indeed, at least one Congressman noted in
a floor speech that the statutes were "intended to defend our commerce, according to
the law of nations." 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1826 (1798) (remarks of Mr. Macon). Again,
however, that clause cannot supply the whole answer, as the authorization of prisoner
exchanges, for example, does not have the effect of punishing offenses against the law
of nations. Congress instead seems to have assumed that it had inherent authority to
legislate on the subject because foreign affairs issues are committed to the federal
government by the Constitution, and Congress is the federal government's sole legis-
lative organ. As one Congressman opined,
[h]e had no doubt, that when one nation infringes the rights of another, it
had a right to take measures against it; but this right was lodged in the sover-
eignty of the nation, and as that, in this country, does not lie wholly in the
President, but in Congress, the President has no power to act in the case.
Id. at 1828 (remarks of Mr. Bayard). This argument is inconsistent with a proper
understanding of Article I, Section 1, however, which vests Congress only with those
powers "herein granted." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. It is the President, and not Con-
gress, who is accorded responsibility by the Constitution for the conduct of foreign
affairs. Congress may have acted outside the scope of its constitutionally granted pow-
ers in passing at least some of these statutes.
89 Act of May 28, 1798, § 4, 1 Stat. at 575.
90 See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1819 (1798) (remarks of Mr. Shepard) ("It is time, said
he, to tell the French nation, 'we will not submit any longer.").
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to instruct nonmilitary law enforcement personnel that it was lawful
and indeed required for them to imprison captured Frenchmen on
the President's instruction, without any allegation that the Frenchmen
had committed domestic crimes. These dual purposes provide ample
explanation for the structure of the statute's text, and the statute is
not best read as expressing an opinion or intending to imply that the
President would not have had the power to imprison the captured
sailors in the statute's absence.
The second statute, enacted just two weeks later, provided that
all French persons . .. who shall be found acting on board any
French armed vessel . . . shall be reported to the collector of the
port in which they shall first arrive, and shall be delivered to the
custody of the marshal, or of some civil or military officer of the
United States . . . who shall take charge for their safe keeping and
support, at the expense of the United States.9 1
That provision clearly was meant to apply only to Frenchmen cap-
tured by private parties, and not to Frenchmen who were captured by
armed forces of the United States. Although the first provision of the
statute related solely to actions taken by the President, 9 2 the six inter-
vening statutory sections authorized "private armed ships and vessels
of the United States" to capture French marauders, 93 and further pre-
scribed rules regulating such captures and the ensuing distribution of
captured property.94 The requirement that captured Frenchmen
were to be turned over to a marshal or to "some civil or military officer
of the United States" makes sense only as applied to private captures,
as Frenchmen captured by United States forces would already have
been in the custody of "military officer[s] of the United States." 95
This statute, then, merely directed private citizens to turn captured
Frenchmen over to the control of the President, but did not purport
in any way to control the actions of the President once the prisoners
were in his custody.
The third statute, which was passed half a year later, similarly im-
posed no requirements on the President. That statute provided that
"the President... is authorized to exchange or send away from the
United States to the dominions of France, as he may deem proper and
expedient, all French citizens that have been or may be captured and
91 Act of July 9, 1798, § 8, 1 Stat. at 580.
92 See id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 578.
93 Id. § 2, 1 Stat. at 579; see id. §§ 2-7, 1 Stat. at 579-80.
94 See id. §§ 3-7, 1 Stat. at 579-80.
95 Id. § 8, 1 Stat. at 580.
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brought into the United States .... ,,96 Any debates that this provision
may have occasioned were not recorded in the Annals of Congress, and
it is therefore difficult to place this statute within the context of the
events that led to its passage. On its face, however, the statute appears
to be designed to encourage the President to use captured
Frenchmen as bargaining chips to secure the release of Americans
being held prisoner in France. The statute provides no substantive
standards, and expressly leaves all prisoner exchanges to the complete
discretion of the President. It would be a mistake to read the third
statute as implying that the President would have been without power
to effect such exchanges absent congressional authorization.
The one statute from this time period that does appear to require
the President to take certain actions was passed only a few days later.
That statute provided that if the President received information that a
U.S. citizen who was impressed into serving on a foreign vessel of war
was put to death or subjected to corporal punishment after being cap-
tured by France,
it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, and he is
hereby empowered and required to cause the most rigorous retalia-
tion to be executed on any such citizens of the French Republic, as
have been or hereafter may be captured in pursuance of any of the
laws of the United States.
9 7
On its face, the statute seems to require the President to take retalia-
tory measures against captured Frenchmen in his custody, and thus
might be read to imply that Congress was asserting that it had the
authority to dictate prisoner of war policy. A careful examination of
the legislative history of the statute, however, belies such a reading.
The statute was passed in response to a French arrit ordering the
execution of U.S. citizens found on captured warships belonging to
nations that were at war with France. As originally passed by the Sen-
ate and introduced into the House, the measure authorized and re-
quired retaliation against any Frenchmen that the President could
detain, including Frenchmen who were legally in the United States.
The President would have needed congressional authorization to ef-
fect such sweeping retaliatory measures. As the United States was not
at war with France, and the United States citizens who were
threatened by the arrnit were not working on vessels belonging to the
United States or its citizens, the President could not have invoked the
Commander in Chief power to support such unilateral retaliation on
his own authority.
96 Act of Feb. 28, 1799, ch. 18, 1 Stat. 624.
97 Act of March 3,1799, ch. 45, 1 Stat. 743 (emphasis added).
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After it had passed the Senate and was debated for several days in
the House, the retaliation provision was narrowed to captured
Frenchmen who were already in the President's custody. Representa-
tives Gallatin and Smith successfully argued that retaliation should be
limited to those Frenchmen who had actually engaged in predation
against the United States and been captured, and the amendment was
agreed to immediately prior to the passage of the entire bill.9s Al-
though as Commander in Chief the President already enjoyed author-
ity to retaliate against French prisoners who had fallen into his
custody, the rest of the provision was not rewritten to conform with
the last-minute amendment, and the word "required" remained in the
statute as a vestige of its original language.99 Had Congress actually
purported to require the President to retaliate against prisoners
whom he held by virtue of his authority as Commander in Chief, the
provision could have constituted an unconstitutional interference
with presidential prerogatives.
This contextual reading of the statute also indicates that the stat-
ute should not be understood to imply that the President could not
have engaged in retaliation against captured enemy agents absent
congressional authorization. As originally drafted, the bill authorized
retaliation against Frenchmen who were legally within the territory of
the United States, and over whom the President would have had no
inherent authority to inflict punishment. Congress seems not to have
realized that the amendment to the statute brought the issue of retali-
ation within the President's power as Commander in Chief, and thus
did not think to amend the statute to remove the reference to authori-
zation. Even if Congress had intentionally included the word "author-
ized" in the amended provision, absent evidence to the contrary, its
inclusion would probably best be read as designed to encourage the
President to take action, rather than as an expression of an opinion
that the President had no inherent authority as Commander in Chief
to engage in retaliation.
98 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 3047-48 (1799) (remarks of Mr. Gallatin); id. at 3051 (re-
marks of Mr. S. Smith).
99 It is also worthy of note that even prior to the amending of the statute, most
members of Congress seemed to accept that the President would not be legally bound
to engage in retaliation. See, e.g., id. at 3046 (remarks of Mr. Gallatin) ("[K]nowing
... the character of the President ... he did not believe a single case would ever
happen in which it would be exercised."); id. at 3049 (remarks of Mr. Dana) (noting
that "the President ... would not suffer the law, if passed, to be carried into effect").
[VOL- 79:41210
2004] TRANSFERRING TERRORISTS 1211
3. The War of 1812
The Congress that presided over the War of 1812 provides the
only other historical instance that I have been able to identify of direct
congressional involvement in prisoner of war issues. On July 6, 1812,
just three weeks after the United States declared war against Britain,
the Twelfth Congress passed "An Act for the safe keeping and accom-
modation of prisoners of war." The Act authorized the President "to
make such regulations and arrangements for the safe keeping, sup-
port and exchange of prisoners of war as he may deem expedient." 100
It also appropriated funds for the purpose of detaining prisoners of
war. The statute, however, did not establish any substantive standards
governing the disposition of prisoners, and it did not lay any claim to
congressional authority in the area. Although the statute spoke in
terms of "authoriz[ing]" the President to take action, it at best repre-
sented a recognition by Congress of powers that President Madison
already enjoyed by virtue of his position as Commander in Chief and
provided the funds for the exercise of his responsibilities. Indeed, the
Civil War Congress interpreted the statue in precisely this fashion.
In Brown v. United States, Chief Justice Marshall observed in dicta
that Congress's passage of the Act suggested that the President had no
inherent authority to hold and detain captured enemy soldiers.I
Brown was exclusively concerned with the President's authority to con-
fiscate enemy property within the United States, however, a subject that
is expressly reserved to Congress by Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of
the Constitution. 10 2 Marshall's offhand reference to the handling of
prisoners of war was intended to provide an additional example of a
war related power that the President could not exercise without ex-
press statutory authorization. Marshall did not, however, cite any con-
stitutional provision comparable to the Captures Clause of Article I,
Section 8, Clause 11 that expressly delegates to Congress the power to
make rules concerning captured persons. Indeed, there is no such
comparable constitutional provision, and Marshall's comment in
Brown cannot hold up under the weight of longstanding historical
practice to the contrary. Despite the fact that the 1812 Act
was repealed by Congress in 1817,103 Presidents have continued,
100 Act of July 6, 1812, ch. 128, 2 Stat. 777, repealed byAct of March 3, 1817, ch. 34,
3 Stat. 358.
101 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 126 (1814) (noting that the Act "affords a strong im-
plication that [the President] did not possess those powers by virtue of the declaration
of war").
102 Id. at 125-29.
103 See Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 34, 3 Stat. 358.
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with Congress's blessing-usually in the form of supporting appropri-
ations' 04-to exercise exclusive control over prisoner of war policy.
A second prisoner of war issue confronted by the Twelfth Con-
gress indicates that Congress did not believe that legislative authoriza-
tion was required before setting policy concerning captured enemy
combatants. From the very beginning of the war, the United States
protested the treatment that the British accorded captured American
soldiers. To induce the British to give them better treatment, a bill
was introduced in Congress in 1813 to vest the President "with [the]
power[ ] of retaliation [against British POWs]."105 The bill was ini-
tially rejected by the House in November of 1812, and the Annals of
Congress report that "[t]he objections to the bill were not to the princi-
ple of retaliation, but arose from the opinion that such a power al-
ready existed, from usage and from the nature of things, and was
inseparable from sovereignty."10 6 The Act was subsequently reconsid-
ered and enacted 10 7 in the face of a growing furor over British atroci-
ties, but documents entered into the Annals of Congress demonstrate
that the President, without challenge to his authority, had already in-
stituted several retaliatory measures in order to protect captured
American soldiers. 10 8 Congress never asserted that it possessed any
constitutional authority to regulate prisoner treatment, nor did it
challenge the President's Commander in Chief and Executive powers
in this area. Rather, Congress merely sought to encourage the Presi-
dent to take a more aggressive approach toward Britain.
4. The Mexican War
During the Mexican War, the cost of maintaining captured Mexi-
can soldiers was deemed to be too high. President James K Polk
therefore approved a policy in 1846 whereby captured Mexican
soldiers would be released on parole and permitted to return to their
104 See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 81, § 1, 13 Stat. 495, 496; Act of June 15,
1864, ch. 124, § 1, 13 Stat. 126, 128; Act of Feb. 9, 1863, ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat. 642, 644;
Act of July 5, 1862, ch. 133, § 1, 12 Stat. 505, 507.
105 LEwIs & MEWHA, supra note 62, at 23.
106 25 ANNALS OF CONG. 1144 (1813).
107 See Act of March 3, 1813, ch. 61, 2 Star. 829.
108 Letter from Thomas Pinckney, Major General, to the Secretary of War (Nov. 4,
1812), reprinted in 25 ANNALS OF CONG. 1239 (1813) ("Information having been given
... that six American seamen . . . had been sent to Jamaica to be tried as British
subjects, for treason, he called upon the marshal to retain double that number of
British seamen as hostages."); see also 27 ANNALS OF CONG. 2098-238 (1814) (commu-
nicating the Secretary of State's report to the President detailing, inter alia, reports of
retaliation of both the United States and Great Britain).
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homes on the condition that they would not re-engage in hostili-
ties. 109 President Polk hoped that this policy not only would allow the
army to prosecute the attack on Mexico without having to devote an
undue number of troops to guard duty, but also that the leniency of
the policy would curry favor with Mexican citizens and encourage
them to put pressure on their government to bring about a quick set-
tlement to the war.110 President Polk later modified the parole policy
in 1847, ordering that captured Mexican officers be detained with an
eye toward exchanging them for captured American soldiers being
held by the Mexicans."' It appears that at no time during the course
of the war did anyone in Congress challenge the President's constitu-
tional authority to regulate and establish prisoner of war policy on
behalf of the United States.
5. The Civil War
During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln was faced with
the task of managing thousands of captured Confederate soldiers.
President Lincoln created the post of Commissary General of Prison-
ers in 1861 to direct the disposition of POWs. 112 Although the Com-
missary General's office was originally placed under the jurisdiction of
the Quartermaster General, that arrangement was later changed in
1862, and the office thereafter became subject only to the orders of
the War Department. 113 As can be seen from this command structure,
POWs were throughout the Civil War subject to the exclusive control
of the President, exercised under the auspices of the War
Department.
President Lincoln's War Department made various uses of the
POWs as the war progressed. In July of 1862 the Administration en-
tered into an agreement with Confederate authorities setting forth
procedures for the exchange of captured soldiers." 4 Later, in 1863
and 1864, the President approved a proposed War Department plan
to recruit captured Confederate soldiers who agreed to take an oath
of loyalty to serve in the Union army. During the same time period, a
handful of Confederate POWs held in Illinois and New York were or-
dered to perform labor on various minor construction projects, in-
109 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 62, at 25-26.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 26.
112 Id. at 28.
113 Id. at 28-29.
114 Id. at 29-30.
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cluding water works and drainage ditches. I 15  Finally, after the
surrender of the Confederate army at Appomatox on April 9, 1865,
explicit terms and conditions were established for the release of cap-
tured soldiers who were still being held in confinement."
l 6
A spirited debate in the Senate during January of 1865 regarding
a measure urging the President to retaliate against captured Confed-
erate soldiers strongly demonstrates Congress's view that the ultimate
constitutional authority to decide prisoner of war policy resided in the
President. In the face of mounting evidence that the Confederacy was
starving and otherwise mistreating captured Union soldiers, Senator
Wade of Ohio moved the adoption of S.R. No. 97, a joint resolution
urging President Lincoln to take retaliatory measures.'1 7 Signifi-
cantly, rather than speaking in terms of "authorizing" or "command-
ing" the President to take action, the resolution declared that "in the
judgment of Congress, it has become justifiable and necessary that the
President should, in order to prevent the continuance and recurrence
of such barbarities . . . resort at once to measures of retaliation
. 1. 18 To emphasize congressional recognition of the President's
prerogative in this area, the resolution explicitly stated that "Congress
do not [sic], however, intend by this resolution to limit or restrict the
power of the President to the modes or principles of retaliation
herein mentioned, but only to advise a resort to them as demanded by
the occasion." 1 9 Indeed, during the debates over the resolution, sev-
eral Senators expressly remarked that the President already had inher-
ent authority to effect retaliatory measures by virtue of his position as
the Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief of the armed
forces. Senator McDougall forcefully expressed this sentiment in a
floor speech, stating:
[W] e have been for a week talking about a thing that does not be-
long to the... Senate or House of Representatives, but belongs to
the province of the Executive, and undertaking to give advice to the
President of the United States, who has charge of this business, and
whose particular duty it is to see that he understand it, and that he
executes his office in a proper manner.' 20
The Senator later reiterated his concern, concluding, "I vote
against this proposition upon the ground that it has no business either
115 Id. at 39.
116 Id. at 40-41.
117 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 363-64 (1865).
118 Id. at 363 (remarks of Sen. Wade) (emphasis added).
119 Id. at 364.
120 Id. at 522.
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in this Hall or in the other Hall of Congress, but belongs to a depart-
ment of the Government which has full authority over it."121
Of further significance, the retaliation statute that Congress
passed during the War of 1812 was characterized during the debate as
merely expressing Congress's opinion "that [retaliation in the face of
outrageous enemy practices] was a duty which was then incumbent
upon the Executive as the Commander in Chief of the Army as it is
now."122 In sum, the Civil War Congress firmly recognized that the
President possessed inherent authority to dispose of the liberty of pris-
oners of war by virtue of his constitutional position as Commander in
Chief, and consequently made no challenge at any time during the
war to his repeated unilateral exercise of that power.
6. The Spanish-American War
The War Department began its planning for the treatment of
POWs captured during the Spanish-American War prior to actually
engaging in hostilities. 123 Plans were drafted but ultimately aban-
doned to use Spanish POWs captured in Santiago de Cuba and Puerto
Rico to build roads accessing the interior of the islands for use by the
121 Id.; see also id. at 408 (remarks of Sen. Brown) (stating that "the doctrine of
retaliation has [already] been recognized and has been applied by the Government of
the United States and its officers in the present war" and that the wording of the
resolution "shows that... the President, as the Executive Officer of the Government,
charged with its execution, was not to be understood as being limited in his action by
any suggestion which might be contained in the body of that resolution"); id. at 413
(remarks of Sen. Davis) (noting that the resolution merely constituted a request for
the President to take action); id. at 427 (remarks of Sen. Davis):
This law may be taken up by the President of the United States without any
additional legislation upon the part of Congress just as it exists, and it may
be executed by him; and as some of the members of the Senate have main-
tained .... there is no reason whatever for the interposition of Congress in
this matter at this time. So far as the law of retaliation exists, so far as it may
be legitimately executed, it is to be decided by the law of nations, and the
President of the United States, without any ancillary legislation on the part
of Congress, may execute that law just as he could and to the same extent
and rigor with which he might execute it backed by any legislation which
Congress would adopt.
Id.; id. at 429 (remarks of Sen. Howard) (assuming the authority of the President to
dispose of the liberty of prisoners of war in stating that "I shall presume in this discus-
sion that the executive branch of the Government have at least tried faithfully to do
their duty to the country, and that if they have failed in bringing about this exchange
and the liberation of our prisoners in rebel hands, they have innocently failed").
122 Id. at 431 (remarks of Sen. Howard).
123 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 62, at 43-44.
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army. 1 24 Later, during the occupation of the Philippines, the War De-
partment determined how to handle the detention of captured Fili-
pino insurrectionists. It ultimately decided to parole insurrectionists
who agreed to take an oath of allegiance to the United States, but
deported to Guam insurrectionists who refused to take the oath. 125 As
in previous wars, it appears that Congress made no effort to intervene
in the President's control over the detention and disposition of pris-
oners of war.
7. World War I
Planning for World War I began in July of 1916. It was quickly
determined that "the War Department should take charge of prison-
ers of all classes captured or arrested by any agency of the government
in time of war." 126 Within the War Department, responsibility for han-
dling POWs was assigned at first to the office of the Adjutant General,
and later to the newly created office of the Provost Marshal General
(PMG).127 In March 1918, the War Department promulgated exten-
sive regulations governing the domestic employment of POWs who
were shipped to the United States from Europe for internment.
1 28
The regulations provided that POWs could either be hired out on a
case-by-case basis to private parties and corporations or be made to
perform labor on public works projects such as road building, for
which the government would pay them the prevailing private wage. 129
Although POWs were used during World War I to perform construc-
tion and salvage work in Europe, 130 it was the announced policy of the
United States throughout the conflict not to transfer any POWs to the
control of Allied powers. 131 Nevertheless, the United States did allow
the Allies to transfer numerous prisoners of war to its control, particu-
larly during the campaign in France. 13 2 Again, Congress took no ac-
tion in regard to prisoners of war that indicated it believed it had any
constitutional authority or competence in that area.
124 Id. at 44.
125 Id. at 46.
126 Id. at 50.
127 Id. at 50, 58-59.
128 Id. at 56.
129 Id. at 55-56.
130 Id. at 61-63.
131 Id. at 52.
132 Id. at 52-53, 59.
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8. The Interwar Years
The War Department engaged in significant prisoner of war plan-
ning during the twenty-odd year period between the two World Wars.
The Provost Marshal General's Department was abolished soon after
the end of World War 1.133 This left a significant vacuum of responsi-
bility, however, when the United States signed the Geneva Prisoner of
War Convention of 1929, thereby assuming the international obliga-
tion to establish a domestic War Information Bureau to collect and
dispense information about POWs in the event of a war. Responsibil-
ity for prisoner of war planning was therefore transferred to the Adju-
tant General's office and remained there until a new Provost Marshal
General was appointed in the summer of 1941.134 Anticipating the
entry of the United States into World War II, the PMG ordered the
construction of detention facilities in the southwestern United States
beginning in the fall of 1941.135 The PMG also issued regulations es-
tablishing the conditions under which POWs could be employed as a
source of wartime labor.
1 3 6
9. World War II
American prisoner of war policy underwent several significant
transformations during the Second World War. Moreover, POW pol-
icy varied from front to front depending on the tactical conditions
that the army faced and the types of operations in which the army was
engaged. Rather than examine the handling of POWs during World
War II in minute detail, it is easier to sketch the broad themes that
characterized U.S. policy.
Although the army underwent several reorganizations during the
course of the war, the Office of the Provost Marshal General remained
at all times directly in charge of handling POWs. 13 7 The PMG's office
was broken up into different sections for operations on the various
theaters of the war, each under the ultimate command of the Allied
Commander in Chief.138 At the Commander in Chief's direction,
soldiers captured in North Africa and in Europe were extensively em-
ployed in support of advancing troops on construction and other
projects, freeing Allied units to directly participate in combat on the
133 Id. at 67.
134 Id. at 70.
135 Id. at 73.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 80-81, 175.
138 Id. at 175-76, 207.
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front lines. 13 9 This was particularly true of nonfascist Italian POWs,
who proved to be more cooperative than their German counterparts
and who were formed into regular work companies called "Italian Ser-
vice Units" or ISUs. I 40 POWs who refused to work or were otherwise
deemed unfit for employment were kept in central enclosures well
away from the front lines,' 4 ' where there was no danger that the Axis
armies would attempt to free them.
Many prisoners of war captured in early campaigning were
shipped to the United States, where they were either put to work or
placed in internment camps. Homefront employment of POWs be-
came sufficiently extensive by the summer of 1943 that the Secretary
of War enlisted the aid of another executive agency, the War Man-
power Commission, to aid in the effective utilization of POW labor
resources and to ensure that POW labor was distributed to areas of
pressing need, such as food processing, lumbering, and the railroad
industry.' 4 2 The War Department and the War Manpower Commis-
sion not only determined in which industries POWs could, consistent
with the dictates of the Geneva Convention, be employed, but also
established wage scales for the various types of work performed by the
POWs.1 43 Furthermore, at the close of hostilities the President and
the War Department determined the conditions and the timetable
under which POWs would be released.1
4 4
World War II provides the first large-scale U.S. example of mas-
sive prisoner of war transfers to foreign nations. During the course of
World War II, the United States transferred tens of thousands of pris-
oners of war to the control of other nations. Shortly after the surren-
der of the Italian and German forces in Tunisia in May of 1943, the
United States transferred 15,000 of its Italian POWs and 5000 of its
German POWs to French control for labor purposes.1 4 5 A similar ar-
rangement was made on the continent after V-E Day in 1945, whereby
the United States agreed to transfer 1,300,000 POWs to the control of
France, Belgium, and Luxembourg to perform necessary labor on
public works projects. 14 6 Seven hundred thousand POWs were ulti-
mately transferred. 147 It is highly significant that a POW transfer of
139 Id. at 94-95, 176-77.
140 Id. at 94-95, 177.
141 Id. at 221.
142 Id. at 106, 119.
143 Id. at 120-23.
144 Id. at 204, 241-43.
145 Id. at 177.




this scale was made in the sole discretion of the President even after
the hostilities in Europe had been concluded.
The most complicated and elaborate transfer schemes employed
by the United States during World War II were tailored to the unusual
conditions that prevailed in the Middle Eastern theater. In early 1943,
the PMG found itself unprepared to handle a large influx of POWs in
this area, and therefore directed that any enemy soldiers who were
captured be immediately turned over to British control. 148 By the
summer of 1943, however, the American command had established an
infrastructure capable of handling POW internment, and the United
States and Great Britain agreed that "[e]ach nation, after the initial
documentation [of the capture], was to assume responsibility for one-
half the total number of prisoners of war captured, after the deduc-
tion of any [POWs] captured by a third ally."' 49 Later, a new wrinkle
was added to this policy when an additional complication arose: the
British had an agreement with the Egyptian government allowing
them to import prisoners of war into the country, but the United
States did not.150 An arrangement was therefore agreed to whereby
American-held POWs were transferred to British control, shipped into
Egypt as British POWs, and then restored to the United States.
151
Although relatively few POWs were captured in the Pacific thea-
ter during World War II, the United States nevertheless made arrange-
ments to turn POWs captured there over to foreign control. Japanese
forces that were captured in the "Southwest Pacific Area" were trans-
ferred to the control of the Commonwealth of Australia, largely be-
cause the United States lacked sufficient rear area facilities and
personnel to adequately maintain the POWs itself.152 Similar compli-
cations in the China-Burma-India Theater led the United States to
turn all POWs captured in that vicinity over to the nearest British
headquarters.
53
The United States also on several occasions during World War II
agreed to accept control of prisoners of war captured by its Allies; in
August of 1942, for example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to accept
150,000 POWs from the British because the British were having a diffi-
cult time mustering sufficient supplies to sustain them. 54 A similar
arrangement was agreed to in November of 1942, whereby 25,000 Ital-
148 Id. at 201.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 202-03.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 247.
153 Id. at 260.
154 Id. at 83.
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ian POWs captured by the British in Kenya were shipped to the
United States and maintained there under U.S. control. 15 5 Finally, at
the outset of the joint American-British invasion of North Africa in
1943, it was agreed that all POWs captured in Northwest Africa by





The United States did not have to develop a detailed prisoner of
war policy during the Vietnam War, as it agreed early on in the hostili-
ties to transfer all enemy soldiers that it captured in Vietnam to the
custody and control of the South Vietnamese government.158 This ar-
rangement was formalized by the commander of the U.S. forces in
Vietnam and the South Vietnamese Minister of Defense in the West-
moreland-Co Agreement on September 27, 1965.159 The United
States was not satisfied with the efforts made by the South Vietnamese
government to exchange POWs for captured American soldiers, how-
ever, and therefore seized on an opportunity that materialized in July
of 1966 to retain some POWs under its own control when the
crewmembers of several North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats (PT
boats) were captured in the Gulf of Tonkin. 160 The State and Defense
Departments worked jointly to establish the conditions under which
the POWs were confined and interrogated, and later worked jointly to
try to repatriate the prisoners to North Vietnam in exchange for the
release of American POWs. 16 1 The Defense Department ordered that
the Geneva Convention guidelines be strictly adhered to with respect
to the PT boat prisoners in order to put pressure on North Vietnam to
accord captured Americans similarly humane treatment.162 When it
became obvious that no formal exchange agreement would be se-
cured, the State Department ordered that all of the POWs be released
155 Id. at 88.
156 Id. at 90 n.43.
157 I do not here discuss the disposition of POWs during the Korean War, because
POW policy during that conflict was established by the U.N. Command and not by the
United States.
158 See GEORGE S. PRUGH, LAW AT WAR: VIETNAM 1964-1973, at 62-65 (1975).
159 See VERNON E. DAVIS, TH4E LONG ROAD HOME: U.S. PRISONER OF WAR POLICY
AND PLANNING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 94 (2000).
160 See id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 94-95.
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At the conclusion of Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1990,
approximately 4000 military detainees were transferred to the control
of Panamanian authorities. 164 Although the Panamanian detainees
were accorded POW treatment as a matter of policy, the Bush Admin-
istration never reached any conclusion that the United States was obli-
gated to do so as a matter of law. 165 Thus, Operation Just Cause
provides an additional example of the unilateral transfer by the Presi-
dent of military detainees who were not entitled to prisoners of war
status to the custody of a foreign nation.
12. The Gulf War
The United States transferred thousands of captured Iraqi
soldiers to the custody of Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War.166 No
statute authorized the President to transfer the detainees, yet Con-
gress did not protest the transfers and took no action indicating that it
believed that it had authority under the Constitution to address them.
13. Conclusion
Practice since the Founding shows that the political branches
have recognized that the President's Commander in Chief and Chief
Executive powers constitute an affirmative grant of authority to the
President to "dispose of the liberty" of prisoners of war. Control over
prisoners has been considered the prerogative of army commanders
in chief throughout American history. With the exception of the stat-
utes passed during the Quasi-War with France, and the War of 1812,
authorizing the President to take and retaliate against prisoners of
war, Congress has never sought to regulate the disposition of POWs or
asserted that it has any authority over them. Indeed, even the statutes
from the Quasi-War with France and the War of 1812 did not truly
"regulate" the disposition of POWs, but rather, without providing
binding rules or standards, authorized and provided financial support
163 Id. at 95.
164 See FREDERIC L. BORCH, JUDGE ADVOCATES IN COMBAT 105 (2001).
165 See Mark Martins, War Crimes During Operations Other Than War, 149 MIL. L.
REv. 145, 172 (1995); Letter from Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Richard L. Thornburg, U.S. Attorney General (Jan. 31, 1990), cited in Noriga
Controversy, NY TIMES, Feb. 3, 1990, at A8.
166 U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GuLF WAR 520 (1992).
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for vigorous presidential action. As far as I can tell, there have been
no judicial decisions or congressional action challenging unilateral
presidential decisions, taken in wartime, regulating the disposition of
captured enemy combatants. The unbroken historical chain of exclu-
sive presidential control over enemy combatants captured in time of
war not only fills out the historical picture, but shows how the
branches over time have interpreted the Constitution.
Historical practice also clearly demonstrates that the President's
authority over prisoners of war includes discretion to transfer custody
and control over prisoners of war to other sovereign nations. There is
a rich historical tradition of such transfers, beginning as far back as
the Revolutionary War and with the most prominent examples occur-
ring in World War II and Vietnam. The admittedly considerable ex-
panse of time during which no such transfers were effected by the
United States, which spans the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the
Civil War, and the Spanish-American War, can be explained by the
absence of any allies in those wars to which a POW transfer might
have been deemed desirable. The advent of alliance warfare during
World War I provided the United States with its first opportunity in
over a century to engage in prisoner of war transfers, but the military
made the policy determination-without ever disclaiming the author-
ity to engage in POW transfers-that it preferred to retain control
over all soldiers that it captured. The extensive use of prisoner of war
transfers during subsequent conflicts, however, confirms the accept-
ance of the President's authority and discretion to dispose of the lib-
erty of captured enemy personnel as he sees fit. During this history,
neither Congress nor the judiciary ever challenged or called into
question the power of the President to do so.
167
167 Much has been made during the current armed conflict of the distinction be-
tween individuals captured during military operations that are entitled to formal pris-
oner of war status under the Geneva Conventions and those who are not. See, e.g.,
George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants, 96
Am. J. INT'L L. 891 (2002); Daniel Kanstroom, "Unlawful Combatants" in the United
States, 30 HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (2003); Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, "Unlawful
Combatants" or "Prisoners of War": The Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
59 (2003). For an explanation of why al Qaeda detainees are not legally entitled to
formal prisoner of war status under the Geneva Conventions, see Yoo & Ho, supra
note 40, at 215-29.
Regardless of where one stands on the legal status of al Qaeda and Taliban de-
tainees, it is clear that the President's power as Commander in Chief to dispose of the
liberty of individuals captured during military engagements is not limited to those
who are legally entitled to prisoner of war status. During the Civil War, for example,
the President negotiated terms for the exchange of civilian prisoners captured by the
Union army during military operations. LEWIs & MEWHA, supra note 62, at 29. And
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III. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE TRANSFER OF CAPTURED
ENEMY COMBATANTS
The fact that the President has the constitutional authority to en-
gage in military transfers does not mean that the power is not subject
to certain constraints. Under international law, transfers are subject
to limitations imposed by two treaties to which the United States is a
party, the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War (GPW) 168 and the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Tor-
ture Convention). 169 Under domestic law, transfers are subject to lim-
itations imposed by legislation implementing the Torture
Convention 170 and by criminal statutes prohibiting conspiracies to
during World War II, the Commander in Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force
issued regulations governing the disposition of captured individuals not in uniform.
Those regulations provided that
unless they can produce evidence to prove that they have the right to treat-
ment as Prisoners of War, [captured personnel not in uniform] will be de-
tained as civilian suspects. Those of FRENCH nationality may be handed
over to the FRENCH while those of other nationalities will be retained in
custody.
Id. at 215. The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, which was adopted in the aftermath of the Second World War, explicitly ac-
knowledged that it was to be expected that during the course of war military forces
would capture and detain individuals who had taken no part in active combat. See
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
3, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 [hereinafter GPW] (noting that the Con-
vention applies to "[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities"); id. art. 4(A) (4), 6
U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138 (stating that the Convention applies to "[p]ersons
who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof'); id. art.
4(A) (5), 6 U.S.T. at 3322, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140 (stating that the Convention applies to
members of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft). Finally, even
though Viet Cong captured in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War were indige-
nous rebels and therefore not entitled to prisoner of war status, the United States
nevertheless transferred them to the custody and control of South Vietnam. See
PRUGH, supra note 158, at 62. Historical practice firmly supports the power of the
President to transfer and otherwise dispose of the liberty of all individuals captured
incident to military operations, and not merely those individuals who may technically
be classified as prisoners of war under relevant treaties.
168 GPW, supra note 167.
169 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Torture Convention].
170 See, e.g., Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822 (1998) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1231 note (2000)).
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commit torture outside the United States. 171 Most of these legal con-
straints do not apply to transfers made in the context of the current
armed conflict against the Qaeda terrorist organization. Nevertheless,
those rules that do apply can be seen to have significantly affected
U.S. policy in this area. Contrary to the implications of critics, 172 war-
time practices, like peacetime measures, are bounded by the rule of
law.
A. Limitations on POW Transfers Imposed by the Geneva Conventions
It has long been a recognized international practice for one na-
tion to transfer prisoners of war that it has captured to the custody
and control of other nations that are either neutral countries or co-
belligerents. 173 Articles drawn up at an international conference in
Brussels in 1874 expressly provided for the transfer of prisoners of war
to neutral countries during ongoing hostilities, and the 1929 Geneva
Convention relating to prisoners of war also authorized such transfers
under certain circumstances.1 74 Indeed, the 1929 Convention ex-
pressly distinguished the obligations of the "Capturing Power" from
the obligations of the "Detaining Power," implicitly recognizing that
the two Powers frequently would not be one and the same. Rather
than authorize transfer, these agreements recognized and codified
preexisting practice under the customary laws of war.
The historical practice of POW transfer is perhaps most explicitly
recognized and regulated by the most recent international agreement
on the subject, the 1949 GPW. Among other things, the GPW estab-
lishes rules governing the transfer of POWs between sovereign na-
tions. Article 12 states that "[p]risoners of war may only be
transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a party to the
Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the
willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the Conven-
tion."175 Articles 109 and 110 provide for the accommodation of
POWs in neutral countries under certain circumstances. All of these
provisions are intended to limit the circumstances under which POWs
can be transferred between nations, but their inclusion in the Conven-
171 See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2000 & Supp. 2003).
172 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
173 See WILLIAM E.S. FLORY, PRISONERS OF WAR: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 44-45 (1942).
174 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27,
1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343; see THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS, HISTOR-
ICAL BACKGROUND OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR
56-59 (1943).
175 GPW, supra note 167, art. 12, 6 U.S.T. at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146.
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tion demonstrates that the drafters understood that in their absence
commanders in chief have virtually unfettered discretion under inter-
national law to transfer custody of POWs to other nations.
Article 12, quoted in full above, imposes two initial limitations on
transfers of prisoners of war. The first requirement, which holds that
the Transferee Power must be a party to the GPW, is both easy to
understand and unlikely to prove particularly limiting in practice, as
virtually every nation in the world has signed it.176 The requirement
that the Detaining Power "satisf[y] itself" that the Transferee Power is
"willing" to apply the GPW, however, is considerably more vague. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has expressed the
opinion that the Detaining Power can fulfill its obligation only
through a prior investigation, which it suggests be conducted under
the auspices of the power assigned to protect the prisoners. 17 7 It
seems at best a strained and embellished reading of the text, however,
to maintain that Article 12 requires that the Detaining Power have
actual knowledge of the conditions in which the other power will keep
a transferred POW, or that the other power guarantee a certain kind
of treatment. The phrase "satisfi[y] itself' does not on its face require
a prior investigation of the sort contemplated by the ICRC, but in-
stead suggests that whether the receiving nation will meet with the
GPW is for the transferring country to determine. Further, Article 12
does not state that the Detaining Power must satisfy itself that the
transferee nation will honor the strict letter of the GPW in every re-
spect. Rather, a separate sentence of Article 12 indicates that the De-
taining Power's responsibility is limited to ascertaining that the
transferee nation will not breach the GPW "in any important re-
spect. ' 178 The ICRC has interpreted that phrase to mean "systematic
violations of the Convention," breaches causing "serious prejudice to
the prisoners," and "grave breaches of the Convention" as defined by
Article 130.179 Even the ICRC, therefore, acknowledges that the De-
taining Power need not satisfy itself that the transferee nation will
meet every requirement of the GPW in its treatment of any individual
POW. While the exact requirements of Article 12 are vague, its basic
purpose is clearly to ensure that formal prisoners of war receive basic
176 See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross: Status of Four Geneva Conventions and Addi-
tional Protocols I and I, 30 I.L.M. 397, 398-402 (1991).
177 See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION REL-
ATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 136 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [herein-
after GPW COMMENTARY].
178 GPW, supra note 167, art. 12, 6 U.S.T. at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146 (emphasis
added).
179 GPW COMMENTARY, supra note 177, at 138.
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GPW protections even after they have been transferred to the control
and custody of other nations.
Once a POW is formally transferred, the GPW establishes that the
Detaining Power is no longer responsible for the treatment that the
POW receives.18 0 If, however, the "Protecting Power"-typically the
ICRC-complains that the transferee nation is not honoring the
GPW's limitations, the Detaining Power must investigate the Protect-
ing Power's claim, and might even be required to request the return
of the prisoner. Like the up-front limitations on POW transfers, how-
ever, these back-end GPW requirements are entirely self-enforcing
and subject to interpretation, leaving transferring nations a great deal
of discretion in the manner in which they elect to uphold their treaty
obligations.
Although the GPW imposes substantial international law con-
straints on the President's ability to effect military transfers, the Con-
vention is deliberately limited in scope and generally does not apply
to terrorists captured by the United States during the course of the
present conflict. The GPW's protections for POWs are explicitly made
to apply only in "all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them."'' As a
nonstate terrorist organization, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting
Party to the Geneva Conventions, and members of al Qaeda therefore
have no rights under the GPW. The GPW, therefore, does not apply to
the conflict between the United States and al Qaeda. Members of al
Qaeda who are captured consequently are not legally entitled to POW
status, and the President's ability to transfer captured members of al
Qaeda is in no way limited by the GPW.'8 2 No other international
agreement regulates the treatment of enemy combatants, such as al
Qaeda operatives, who do not fight on behalf of a nation-state and
who refuse to obey the laws of war.18
3
180 GPW, supra note 167, art. 12, 6 U.S.T. at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146.
181 GPW, supra note 167, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146.
182 For a more complete elaboration of these points, see Yoo & Ho, supra note 40,
at 215-28.
183 Some might argue that the requirements of the GPW have coalesced into cus-
tomary international law governing the treatment of all combatants in an interna-
tional armed conflict. The ability of treaty norms to become customary international
law that extends beyond the limits of the original treaty is controversial and, even if it
is possible, would be presumed to happen only rarely. Even if the Geneva Conven-
tions were thought to be susceptible to such transformation, it does not appear to
have met the requirements necessary. In particular, some parties to the Geneva Con-
ventions, in a subsequent protocol to the treaties, sought to relax the requirements
for granting POW status to those fighting for nonstate actors. The United States re-
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On the other hand, both the United States and Afghanistan are
High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions. The GPW en-
tered into force in the United States on February 2, 1956, and Afghan-
istan acceded to it on September 26, 1956.184 Even individuals
fighting for a High Contracting Party are not entitled to POW status
under the GPW, however, unless they meet certain standards set forth
in Article 4 of the Convention, including being a member of an
armed force or related militia or volunteer corps that wears uniforms,
bears arms openly, and obeys the laws of war. 18 5 On February 7, 2002,
the President issued his determination that under these criteria none
of the Taliban prisoners are entitled to POW status. Because the Ge-
neva Conventions are non-self-executing treaties, the President has
the sole executive authority to interpret and apply the Geneva Con-
ventions on behalf of the nation. 186 Consequently, the GPW's limita-
tions on the ability to transfer POWs do not apply to Taliban
prisoners. The GPW establishes no minimum standards regulating
the transfer of combatants who do not meet the definition of a POW
under Article 4.187
B. Limitations Imposed on the Transfer of Detainees
by the Torture Convention
In addition to the GPW, the Torture Convention establishes cer-
tain restrictions on the ability of state parties to transfer individuals
within their control. The Torture Convention prohibits contracting
parties from transferring individuals who are in their custody, within
their territory, to the control of foreign governments that are more
likely than not to torture them. Article 3 of the Torture Convention
specifies that "[n] o State Party shall expel, return ('refouler') or extra-
dite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."
' 188
Article 2 provides that "[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever,
whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or
fused to sign that protocol and has consistently objected to that change in the laws of
war. For further explanation, see Yoo & Ho, supra note 40, at 226-27.
184 See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 176, at 398, 401.
185 GPW, supra note 167, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
186 For general discussion of the separation of powers in treaty interpretation, see
John Yoo, Politics as Laws?: The Anti-Ballistic Missle Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and
Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REv. 851 (2001); John Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the
False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1305 (2002).
187 For further explanation of these points, see generally Yoo & Ho, supra note 40.
188 Torture Convention, supra note 169, art. 3, 98 S. TREArV Doc. No. 100-20, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 114.
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any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of tor-
ture."189 The United States is a party to the Convention. President
Reagan signed the Convention on April 18, 1988, and the Senate con-
sented to it on October 27, 1990.
Two of the Senate's reservations, understandings, and declara-
tions accompanying the Convention are worth mentioning here.
First, the United States expressed the understanding that the phrase
"substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture" in Article 3 means that "it is more likely than not
that he would be tortured."190 As a condition of the United States'
consent to the treaty, this understanding substantively limits the obli-
gations under Article 3 of the treaty to the stated interpretation. 191
Second, the United States expressly declared that Article 3 of the Con-
vention is not self-executing. 19 2 As a non-self-executing treaty, 19 3 the
Torture Convention does not, without implementing legislation, pro-
vide a private cause of action in federal court for an individual to op-
pose his expulsion or extradition. Thus, although the Torture
Convention imposes international law constraints on the ability of the
United States to effect transfers, it does not itself provide a prisoner
with the legal grounds to ask a federal court to block his transfer to
another country.
189 Id. art. 2, 98 S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 114.
190 136 CONG. REc. 36,193 (1990).
191 The Senate has the ability to impose conditions on its consent to ratification of
a treaty. See, e.g., Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 183 (1901)
(Brown, J., concurring); Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 32, 35 (1869) ("But the
Senate are not required to adopt or reject [a treaty] as a whole, but may modify or
amend it, as was done with the treaty under consideration."). The Senate's power to
limit the scope of treaties by attaching conditions to its consent to ratification is not
spelled out in the text of the Constitution but has a long historical pedigree and has
been exercised by the Senate since the earliest days of the Republic. See, e.g., Senate
Exec. Journal, 4th Cong., Special Sess., June 24, 1795, at 186 (conditionally con-
senting to the Jay Treaty of 1794 with Great Britain). The Restatement (Third) notes
that "[a] treaty that is ratified or acceded to by the United States with a statement of
understanding becomes effective in domestic law [ ] subject to that understanding."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 314
cmt. d (1987).
192 136 CONG. REC. 36,193 (1990).
193 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111 & cmt. h (1987). The Torture Convention has been implemented through two
statutes, the Torture Victims Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000), which pro-
vides a civil cause of action for torture undertaken by foreign officials, and a criminal
prohibition on torture by American officials which occurs outside the United States.




Although the Torture Convention is non-self-executing, it is nev-
ertheless binding as a matter of international law. However, the Con-
vention is generally inapplicable to transfers effected in the context of
the current armed conflict because it has no extraterritorial effect (ex-
cept in the case of extradition) and, hence, cannot apply to al Qaeda
and Taliban prisoners detained outside of U.S. territory at Guanta-
namo Bay or in Afghanistan. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has
never interpreted the scope of Article 3, under which the United
States cannot "expel," "return," or "extradite" individuals to countries
in which it is more likely than not that they will be tortured, it has
interpreted identical language elsewhere. In the 1993 case involving
the interdiction of massive refugee flows from Haiti, the Supreme
Court held that the Refugee Convention's use of the words "return"
and "expel" means that the treaty's requirements apply only to indi-
viduals being held within the territory of the United States. 194 The
Court explained that the word expel "refers to the deportation or ex-
pulsion of an alien who is already present in the host country."'195 The
word return, on the other hand, which the treaty defines in part by a
parenthetical reference to the French word refouler, "has a legal mean-
ing [that is] narrower than its common meaning."'196 Refouleris not a
synonym for the English word "return," but rather means to "repulse,"
"repel," or "drive back."197 Because the interdiction and detention of
Haitian refugees occurred outside the territorial United States, the
Court held, the Refugee Convention did not apply to the opera-
tion.198 Thus, in the context of international treaties such as the Tor-
ture Convention, the word "return" refers to the involuntary removal
of individuals who have not been legally admitted into the territory of
the host country, but rather have been turned back or detained at the
border.199 "[A] treaty cannot impose uncontemplated extraterritorial
obligations on those who ratify it through no more than its general
humanitarian intent. '200
Given the Supreme Court's interpretation of identical language
in the Refugee Convention, it makes no sense to view the Torture
Convention as affecting the transfer of prisoners held outside the
194 See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 179-83 (1993) (constru-
ing the same words as used in the Conventions Relating to the Status of Refugees).
195 Id. at 180.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 180-81.
198 Thus, the word "return" as used in the Convention does not apply to individu-
als who are apprehended or turned back while on the high seas. Id. at 180-83.
199 Id. at 180-82.
200 Id. at 183.
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United States to another country. 201 This conclusion receives further
support from the canon of construction that statutes and treaties are
not to be read to have extraterritorial effect unless Congress clearly
states its intentions otherwise in the text.20 2 That presumption plays
an important role in ensuring that the political branches have the dis-
cretion to manage the nation's foreign affairs, unless there is a clear
intention to regulate such matters by statute or treaty.20 3 Further-
more, statutes and treaties must be interpreted so as to protect the
President's constitutional powers from impermissible encroachment
and thereby to avoid any potential constitutional problems. 20 4 Here,
reading the Torture Convention to apply extraterritorially would in-
terfere with the President's powers as Commander in Chief and Chief
Executive to direct the operations of the military. The Torture Con-
vention would not be read to have such an effect without a clear state-
ment in the text of the treaty or any implementing legislation.
Further, construing the Torture Convention as applying to the
extraterritorial detention of prisoners of war would create an unac-
ceptable conflict with the GPW. As noted earlier, the GPW establishes
a legal regime for the treatment of prisoners of war. The highly de-
tailed provisions of the GPW are designed to provide a comprehensive
set of requirements defining the full set of obligations that signatories
undertake with respect to the subject matter covered. In generally
prohibiting the extradition, expulsion, or return of individuals under
certain conditions, the Torture Convention does not displace the
GPW's distinct and specialized body of law in its sphere of operation.
To the contrary, the standard rule of construction, applicable to both
treaties and statutes, is that the specific governs the general. Thus
"where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not
201 To the extent that it might be argued that customary international law prohib-
its the transfer of individuals to countries in which it is likely that they will be tortured,
such an international norm would not be binding on the President. Although the
courts have sometimes suggested that customary international law is incorporated by
the Constitution into the domestic law of the United States, see The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law .. "), when doing so
they have always emphasized that customary international law is superseded for do-
mestic purposes by "controlling executive or legislative act[s]." Id. The President's
authorization of a POW transfer would constitute a controlling executive act, and for
domestic law purposes would displace any otherwise applicable norms of customary
international law.
202 See, e.g., Sale, 509 U.S. at 177-87.
203 See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10,
20-22 (1963).
204 Cf Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989).
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be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority
of enactment."
20 5
Although as a matter of international law the Torture Convention
is thus generally inapplicable to the conduct of the war against al
Qaeda abroad, Congress has enacted legislation implementing certain
aspects of the Convention, and it is theoretically possible that Con-
gress might in so doing have enacted domestic law provisions more
sweeping than the Convention itself. A close examination of these
provisions, however, reveals that they, too, impose no binding legal
obligations on the President that are applicable in the current con-
text. First, Congress has required all "heads of the appropriate agen-
cies" to "prescribe regulations to implement the obligations of the
United States under Article 3" of the Convention. 20 6 This is not rele-
vant here, as no regulations that have been promulgated pursuant to
it are applicable to military transfers. 20 7 Congress has also broadly
proclaimed, however, that
[i]t shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite,
or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country
in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person
would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of
whether the person is physically present in the United States. 208
This provision largely tracks the language of the Torture Conven-
tion, but if legally binding it would also significantly extend the Con-
vention's protections to persons who are not physically present in the
United States. Congress expressly referred to this proclamation as a
"policy statement," however, indicating that it should not be con-
strued as an actual interpretation of the treaty language or as a provi-
sion creating judicially enforceable rights. 20 9 Thus, it would seem that
neither of the provisions enacted by Congress imposes binding do-
205 Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) ("[It is a commonplace of statutory construction that the
specific governs the general.").
206 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242(b), 112 Stat. 2681, 2822 (1998) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231 note (2000)).
207 As is discussed above, the Torture Convention does not apply extraterritorially.
Thus, the Department of Defense was not required to promulgate regulations with
respect to military transfers.
208 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
§ 2242(a).
209 See Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 454-55
(1988) (holding with respect to statutory language similarly setting forth the "policy
of the United States" that "[n]owhere in the law is there so much as a hint of any
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mestic law limitations on the President's power to effect military
detainees.
C. Criminal Penalties for Conspiring to Commit Acts of Torture Abroad
Although the foregoing analysis demonstrated that the President
is free from ex ante constitutional and domestic law constraints on his
ability to transfer military detainees held outside the United States to
the custody of foreign nations, the President's conduct is nonetheless
significantly constrained by domestic law because criminal penalties
would likely apply to such transfers if they were deemed to be part of a
conspiracy to commit an act of torture abroad. Title 18 of the U.S.
Code, § 2340A(a), provides:
Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit
torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct
prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or impris-
oned for any term of years or for life.
210
The same penalties are applicable to "[a] person who conspires
to commit an offense under this section."211 This law applies to offi-
cial conduct engaged in by U.S. military personnel, as the statute de-
fines "torture" to mean "an act committed by a person acting under
the color of law," 2 12 and explicitly provides U.S. courts with jurisdic-
tion where "the alleged offender is a national of the United States."
213
The scope of the provision is limited by its applicability only to
acts of torture committed "outside the United States." Because con-
spiracy liability under § 2340A(c) is predicated on an individual's hav-
ing conspired to perform an act that would have constituted an
offense under § 2340A(a), § 2340A(c) applies only to conspiracies the
object of which is the commission of acts of torture abroad. The stat-
ute cannot reasonably be read, however, to exclude from its coverage
conspirators who are inside the United States at the time that they
enter into an otherwise covered conspiracy. So long as the design of a
conspiracy is to commit an act of torture abroad, the locus of the con-
intent to create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable individual rights");
Attakai v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 1395, 1405 (D. Ariz. 1990) (same).
210 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) (2000), amended by Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 811(g), 115 Stat. 272, 381.
211 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340A(c) (West Supp. 2003).
212 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1).
213 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(b)(1).
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spirators at the time that they agree to commit the act of torture is
irrelevant under the statute.
The statute therefore would provide criminal penalties for any
transfer that is found to be part of a conspiracy to commit torture
abroad. Under the general federal criminal conspiracy statute, to es-
tablish the existence of a criminal conspiracy a prosecutor must
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) that two or more people agreed to pursue an unlawful objective;
(2) that the defendant voluntarily agreed to join the conspiracy;
and (3) that one or more members of the conspiracy committed an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
214
The Supreme Court has read the first two of these general re-
quirements into other statutes criminalizing "conspiracies" without
further defining the term. 21 5 The Court has ruled, however, that the
requirement of an overt act is a statutory creation that should not be
read into statutes that do not expressly provide for it.216 It is irrele-
vant for present purposes whether an overt act is required under the
criminal torture statute, however, as the transfer of an individual
would almost certainly itself be sufficient to qualify as the requisite
overt act.
Under the first and second prongs of the general federal criminal
conspiracy statute, for criminal liability to attach the accused must be
shown to have intended to effectuate the criminal object of the con-
spiracy.217 Such an agreement would not have to be explicit to be
prosecuted, as an agreement "can instead be inferred from the facts
and circumstances of the case." 218 Nevertheless, so long as the indi-
viduals ultimately ordering a transfer do not intend for a detainee to
be tortured post-transfer, no criminal liability will attach to a transfer,
even if the foreign country receiving the detainee does ultimately tor-
ture him. Thus, if the U.S. personnel who agree to transfer a detainee
do not intend to effectuate the criminal object that is forbidden by the
criminal torture statute-here, the torturing of the detainee-they
cannot be prosecuted under the statute.
214 United States v. Loe, 262 F.3d 427, 432-33 (5th Cir. 2001) (referring to 18
U.S.C. § 371).
215 See, e.g., Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63-65 (1997) (reading the re-
quirements into the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)).
216 See id. at 64.
217 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443 n.20 (1978).
218 lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975).
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D. Effect of Limitations on United States Policy
As noted at the beginning of this Article, many press accounts
have characterized the United States' practice of military transfers as
amounting to nothing more than for torture. This view, which seems
widely held, is based on the mistaken assumption that domestic and
international law significantly limit the transfer of captured enemy
combatants. Transfers undertaken in wartime between allies are not
subject to the same legal constraints that would apply to extradition or
immigration removal. Transfers effected for the purpose of allowing
or encouraging a foreign nation to torture a military detainee could,
however, subject those ordering such a transfer to federal criminal
liability for conspiracy to commit torture outside the United States.
An actual examination of U.S. policies and procedures, however,
reveals that the U.S. military is quite cognizant of the legal constraints
on its conduct. Indeed, the procedures that the United States has put
in place arguably go above and beyond the call of duty. For example,
when asked about the prospect of military transfers during a press
conference in March 2002, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Douglas J. Feith responded:
We will have understandings with countries if we're going to make
transfers of detainees to them. And we'll have understandings of
various kind [s], not the least being that the basic humane treatment
that we are committed to affording the detainees will be afforded by
the country to whom we transfer them.219
If this represents an accurate statement of U.S. policy, then the
U.S. military is doing far more than the bare minimum that is neces-
sary to avoid criminal liability under the torture conspiracy statute.
Because an agreement, explicit or implicit, is a necessary element of a
conspiracy, to avoid liability under the statute U.S. officials would
need to ensure only that they did not in any way agree to or en-
courage the torturing of military detainees. 220 The actual securing of
assurances from other countries that transferred detainees will not be
219 Press Release, Dep't of Defense, Department of Defense News Briefing (Mar.
22, 2002), available at 2002 WL 15011094.
220 For example, one press account reports that "the CIA's authoritative Director-
ate of Operations instructions, drafted in cooperation with the general counsel, tells
case officers in the field that they may not engage in, provide advice about or en-
courage the use of torture by cooperating intelligence services from other countries."
Priest & Gellman, supra note 2. While the article in which this CIA policy statement
was reported insinuates that it is not actually being followed by U.S. officials in prac-
tice, see id. (quoting one official "who has been directly involved in rendering cap-
fives" as stating that, "[w]e don't kick the [expletive] out of them[; w]e send them to
other countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of them"), if adhered to such an
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tortured is a significantly greater step than domestic law requires, and
would be sufficient to satisfy the United States' obligations under the
Torture Convention and the GPW if those treaties were applicable.
It is, of course, impossible to say whether the policies that have
been put in place by the United States were motivated primarily by
legal considerations, as opposed to moral or political ones. Further-
more, we have no means of knowing how closely public statements
like the one quoted above reflect the reality on the ground. The fact
that Defense Department officials feel compelled publicly to address
issues of this nature, however, bears testament to the powerful effect
that law exerts in this area. To cross the threshold into war is not the
same thing as eliminating the rules, and is not a means to escape the
binding reach of the law; rather, it merely changes the law's form and
substance.
CONCLUSION
Claims that the United States is acting illegally by transferring
captured terrorists to allied countries are exaggerated and incorrect.
These arguments reflect a misunderstanding that the government's
prosecution of the armed conflict against the Qaeda terrorist network
and its allies is governed by the rules regarding the criminal justice
system. The current campaign against al Qaeda, however, is not a sim-
ple matter for law enforcement, but instead is an international armed
conflict governed by the laws of war. As shown, under the laws of war
the President and military commanders historically have transferred
captured enemy combatants to allies. Because the September 11,
2001 attack initiated an international armed conflict with the Qaeda
terrorist group, it triggered the President's authority as Commander
in Chief and the United States' rights under international law to trans-
fer custody of enemy prisoners to other nations. This is not to say that
these transfers are wholly ungoverned by law. It is only to make clear
that these transfers are governed by a different set of rules-the laws
of war-than those that apply in domestic, peacetime affairs.
"agreement avoidance" policy would be sufficient to insulate U.S. officials from poten-
tial criminal liability.
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